

ANVIL

CARTOONS by FEIFFER



A NEW DIRECTION FOR PEACE

PASTERNAK: ROMANTIC REBEL

THE PUBLIC BUYS A GHETTO

BRITISH LABOR IN CRISIS

AND OTHER ARTICLE ON POLITICS AND ART



25c

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

The Campus Awakens	3
New Hope for Socialism	4
New Direction for Peace	5
<i>Sam Bottone</i>	
Pasternak: Romantic Rebel	8
<i>Michael Harrington</i>	
The Crisis of British Labor	12
<i>Bernard Dix</i>	
When the Contract Stopped	14
<i>B. J. Widick</i>	
Sick . . . Sick . . . Sick	16
<i>Jules Feiffer</i>	
The Public Buys a Ghetto	18
<i>Debbie Meier</i>	
The American Century	21
<i>Christopher Marks</i>	
Equality in America	24
<i>Herman Roseman</i>	
A Parable for the Destroyers	26
<i>Bob Bone</i>	
Who Becomes a Communist?	28
<i>Judith Bloch</i>	
Books in Review	29

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Where Anvil Stands...

Anvil and Student Partisan wishes to express the ideas, criticisms and proposals of students who believe in democratic socialism. We address ourselves to those who seek the preservation and extension of democratic values to all forms of political and economic life. We firmly contend that this end must be pursued without deference to the status quo of private property interests, social inequality and human oppression which are characteristic of Western capitalism. At the same time, we are fully aware that totalitarian collectivism, which presently dominates much of the eastern world with its new exploitation and oppression, is the very antithesis of the democratic and equalitarian society which we seek.

We further believe that democracy and socialism are inseparable. Guarantees of democratic rights to all people, without any restrictions, in a society based upon private ownership of the basic means of production and human exploitation, are as impossible as achieving socialism in any society where democratic control is absent from nationalized productive facilities. Socialism cannot exist without democracy. Democracy can only flourish when all human needs are satisfied. Furthermore, a socialist society can only be attained through the conscious thoughtful efforts of a majority of the world's peoples. For this reason we see our task today as an educational and propagandistic one. We seek to encourage a socialist choice as a solution to the power struggle which holds the world in continuous fear and anxiety. This socialist choice must reject both the Western and Communist blocs, neither one of which offers hope of democracy, peace and security. Consequently, the socialist choice is a third choice which must embody and express the hopes and desires of the world's peoples in order to triumph.

Anvil and Student Partisan is open to those who desire to critically examine the socialist tradition and to reevaluate those aspects of it which are no longer applicable. But as our name implies, we claim no impartiality on the major social questions of our time, nor the forces behind them. We will defend colonial movements struggling for freedom from foreign domination and at the same time we will extend our hand to those behind the iron curtain who seek to overthrow their oppressive masters. We will seek to create sympathy for the aspirations of working class movements throughout the world. And we will support the struggles of the American labor movement for a larger share in that better life of which socialism is the final consummation.

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The Campus Awakens

— *New Youth March is Organized*

THE LAST HALF OF 1958 held out the hope of a rebirth of something long-missed on the American campus: a vital and socially conscious student movement.

On October 25th, 10,000 students, Negro and white, poured into Washington, D.C. in a Youth March for Integrated Schools. Despite the generally apolitical and apathetic state of the student population in this country, the Youth March was the largest demonstration of young people in the nation's history. Even when the influence of the Communist Party was at its height and the campus alive with political debate, it was not possible to mobilize half as large a demonstration in the capital.

Broad Composition

However, the significance of the Youth March lies not only in its massive size, but in its form of organization and unprecedentedly broad composition. An impressive list of national youth organizations endorsed, publicized and/or participated (e.g. National Student Association, and the Young Adult Council). Student governments from New York to California wired official support.

In every major college in the East, committees were formed with startling spontaneity. In many schools, clubs with widely divergent interests joined together *for the first time* to push this project. At Brooklyn College, for example, House Plan associations and cultural groups cooperated with the NAACP and Debs Club to rack up four busloads of Marchers.

No less startling was the support the Youth March received from settlement houses and labor unions. Over 50 unions either contributed funds to the March or participated directly in it. The State, County & Municipal Employees sent eleven busloads of their members' children.

At the Lincoln Memorial meeting, the demonstrators agreed to return to Washington this spring, and to present the President and Congress with one million signatures on a petition calling for "a federal policy which will insure the safe and speedy integration of public schools throughout the United States."

Thus, to the enthusiasm generated in the schools by the last March is being added the support of substantial individuals and organizations for the next. This, and other facts, add up to the fact that not for some years has the climate for a youth movement been so favorable.

If the climate for a youth movement has not been so favorable for a long time, the same is true of the need for such a movement—and especially in the Civil Rights field.

For it is American youth who are most cruelly and unreasoningly affected by the behavior of the racists. In desperate attempts to halt the integration of our public schools, Southern extremist leaders have ordered the closing of public schools, and are threatening the destruction of the free education system. Children have suffered humiliation and violence; they have been intimidated and harassed by mobs. It is they who are deprived of educational rights and they who are forced to live in environments of tension, violence—of social insanity.

Under the impact of industrialization and urbanization, the decadent Confederate South is collapsing, along with its old ideologies, including the dog-eared white supremacy myths. But this progressive and inexorable transformation is being resisted by a tenacious minority with vested interests in maintaining the obsolete social structure. By appealing to the ignorance and fear in their constituencies, they attempt to keep alive the framework for special advantage and exploitation.

Confederate Way Goes

Although, in the long run, the racist minority cannot stem the new social forces at work in the South, they may frustrate them temporarily and, in so doing, cruelly exacerbate racial tension and seriously damage democratic institutions.

Fundamentally, social change is the function of masses of men in motion. It is in response to the pressure of public opinion that the wheels of government must ultimately turn, that Congress passes legislation, that the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution, that the President exercises his law enforcement powers.

Unfortunately, the racist minority has out-distanced the liberal community in publicizing its views and has put on a display of strength far in excess of its real support. The result has been that civil rights progress is crippled by a minority's willingness to effect a series of social dislocations, and the failure of the liberal forces effectively to mobilize themselves in a proper counter display.

It is against this background, then, that we applaud the Youth March planned for April 18th and the Petition Campaign. Increasing activity in these projects by the labor movement, as illustrated by George Meany's endorsement of the Petition, is heartening. It is also long overdue. And in many respects, the most encouraging sign is the reawakening of the protest spirit on campus, and the hope it holds out for a new youth movement in America.

New Hope for Socialism

— The American Left Unites

DURING THE DECADE OF CONSERVATISM which began in the United States around 1948, the socialist movement was all but decimated. Today, socialism in American life is without serious influence in the ranks of the working class, without even the pretense of posing as a contender for political power. And yet, in the last few years and even more in the last few months, there are signs of new possibilities for socialism as an organized movement. On the one hand, there have been important developments in this direction within American political life as a whole; and on the other, significant beginnings within the socialist movement itself.

The changes in American political life are fairly obvious. The 1958 elections marked a distinct turn toward the left. The new Congress is the most "liberal" in years, the labor movements, fresh from its victories against "Right-to-Work" has demonstrated signs of a renewed political concern and aggressiveness. And the gigantic struggle for Civil Rights, certainly the most important single social phenomenon in American life today is becoming even more intense as the conflict between the forces of human decency and the partisans of a "Century of Litigation" sharpens.

All this is not to say that a mass movement of the democratic Left has come into existence in the United States. Far from it. The extreme inadequacies and limitations of American liberalism were painfully prominent in the opening days of the Congress. Sam Rayburn and Lyndon Johnson put down the tendencies of liberal insurgence with comparative ease. Then, too, the victory of liberalism was fraught with the contradictions of liberalism. The great, popular campaign against "Right-to-Work" in California, for instance, chiefly benefited "Pat" Brown, a Democratic regular, and Clair Engle who, as a Congressman, had championed Taft-Hartley.

Yet, the turn to the Left remains even if the present tactics of the liberal and labor Left, above all the commitment to the Democratic Party, deprives the mass mandate of much of its significance. It is still possible to say: there are more tendencies in American society working toward change today, even if hesitantly, than at any time in a decade.

The second development, that within the socialist movement, is also heartening. Within two years, the Socialist Party-Social Democratic Federation has established its claim as *the* organized focus of democratic socialist regroupement in the United States. On the one hand, the Socialist Party unified with the Social Democratic Federation to form the SP-SDF. On the other, the welcome granted to the former members of the Independent Socialist League marked a further step in making the SP-SDF the all-inclusive party of democratic socialism in the United States. At the same time, various individuals and smaller groupings have shown a new interest in the SP-SDF.

In the youth field, these developments have perhaps been most fruitful. There, the most important single event has been the merger of the Young Peoples Socialist League and the Young Socialist League to form a new, united YPSL as the affiliate of the SP-SDF. YPSL members participated in

the Youth March for Integrated Schools which brought 10,000 young people to Washington D.C. in the largest youth demonstration in years; they have been active in the National Student Council for a Sane Nuclear Policy; and YPSLs have played an extremely important role in organizing socialist and political clubs on campuses throughout the nation. Here, too, there is a realistic perspective of growth and change.

Indeed, it is now possible to subject the various position on socialist regroupement, debated so vigorously in 1956 and 1957, to scrutiny in the light of actual events.

On the one side, there has been a regroupement of sorts based on the principle of evading a clear stand on the *practical* issue of Communist totalitarianism. This tendency manifested itself most clearly in the New York State elections in 1958. There, the supporters of the *National Guardian*, the Socialist Workers Party and the SWP-oriented paper, "The Young Socialist," joined together in an electoral coalition. This alliance (which has yet to achieve any stable form) compromised on basic issues of socialist politics. It was not simply that there were different sociological theories at work (a range of difference within the community of democratic socialist values is what is needed now). Far beyond that, candidates who supported the Russian intervention into Hungary were aided by those who claim to champion the cause of the Hungarian workers. Such a stratagem is not "broadness"—it is an attack upon the very image of Socialism itself, an identification of human emancipation with its very opposite, totalitarianism. And at the same time, the sectarian principle of *always* running socialist candidates *wherever* that is possible was at work. The results, from the point of view of the supporters of this strategy, were meagre: the campaign proved that the old American Labor Party base had further contracted, and the conclusion of all this compromise was a failure to achieve a permanent place on the ballot.

On the other side, the SP-SDF and YPSL have developed a much broader, more flexible approach. Both the Party and its youth affiliate contain a variety of democratic socialist opinion. Because of this, they have been able to bring back to the socialist movement quite a few who left during the period of decline, and to reach out to new people who are seeking, not a "finished" program, but a place to make critical socialist dissent effective. Furthermore, this has been done without compromise of basic principle, for all tendencies in the SP-SDF and YPSL are committed to the fundamental values of democratic socialism. This kind of approach, events have demonstrated, is clearly the best suited to bringing new life to socialism in America today.

Most of the editors of *Anvil* are members of the SP-SDF and YPSL; many of our contributors are not. But it is possible to voice a sentiment which is becoming all unanimous among democratic socialists in the United States today: of hope that this new beginning, already so encouraging, will lead to a further strengthening and broadening of the influence of democratic socialism in America.

THE EDITOR

New Direction for Peace

— *Disengagement a First Step*

IS THERE A WAY OUT of the stalemate of the cold war? Can peace with freedom be achieved? Or is the only hope the uneasy armed truce, always at the brink of war, and yet unable to break the impasse? To put it another way: is the military and political power of the two great powers so great that effective power can only be organized around their initiative? Is the future to be weighed down by an impending catastrophe which every one can foresee and yet are hopeless to do anything about?

This is stated only to pose the larger question, not to infer that we are going to topple over the brink next week or next year. And yet the drift is toward the holocaust we all fear. Every incident of brinksmanship whether practiced by Dulles or Khrushchev contains within it the possibilities of igniting nuclear war. That it has not occurred thus far seems more like a miracle than the conscious and deliberate involvement of the people in working out a sane and rational policy. It is fear that stays the hand of both sides though they are ready to move up to the brink to achieve their objectives fully cognizant of the terrible consequences involved and yet ready to risk it in the name of these objectives. What greater indictment of these policies than the means by which they move to achieve them!

Peace with freedom. Who can disagree with this? In fact both Washington and Moscow claim it to be the objective and result of their policies. Still it remains illusionary. Increasingly more people are coming to the conclusion that the only way to achieve this goal is outside of the framework of official policies—some form of neutralism, non-involvement, non-participation in military pacts and alliances. In Europe there is the feeling that the deadlock can be resolved only through disengagement—the removal of all foreign troops—American and Russian—and the creation of a militarily neutral and politically independent area. Perhaps many of the specific ideas are wrong in one or another detail, some of them are certainly mutually contradictory but no one believes that *all* problems will be solved. There is, however, a common starting point—a serious questioning of the policies of the past decade.

Need for Radicalism

The purpose here is not to examine the various proposals—the Kennan plan, the Gaitskill plan and the Rapacki plan—in any detail. Instead it is to look at the realities of the disengagement problem, what disengagement can do and what it can not do, and why, while it does not solve all problems of a world caught in the middle of a power struggle, it does offer the beginning of a way out. For any proposal to be even the beginning, it must be radical. It must challenge the basic assumptions and beliefs cherished by both cold war camps. And, perhaps most important of all, it must look to the people and their aspirations as the dynamic of its success. For if there is a truism about the cold war it is that the policies of the two rival camps tend toward atomic struggle. A

new force must be created and new energies released, new hopes engendered so that the crushing weight of armaments and tyrannical rule may be thrown aside.

And if it cannot be achieved in one fell swoop, as indeed it can not, then any step in that direction is to be welcomed.

The Grand Alliance

But before discussing the realities of the disengagement problem, it is necessary to understand how the problem was created and the nature of the forces which have created the problem. The center of the situation is the continent of Europe, divided down the middle by two rival social systems, each part tightly organized into a military bloc by the United States and Russia and each engaged in a nuclear arms race.

At the time of the Grand Alliance against Fascist Germany, many believed that when Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill met at Yalta they were building the foundations for peace. Looking back in retrospect, it is now clear they were laying the ground for a new conflict. The alliance which appeared so steadfast and unified in opposition to Hitler's Germany was already beginning to split apart before Hitler went to his grave. It turned out that instead of being concerned with the creation of a new democratic society each was seeking to express their own imperialistic national interests. Each proclaimed the goal of democracy, but each was singularly uninterested in the rights of the people of smaller nations.

Stalin was interested in the expansion of his own tyrannical rule into East Europe and south into the Middle East. Russia then proceeded to exploit for the benefit of its totalitarian collectivist society the very people who had just emerged from the Fascist dictatorship. Churchill was concerned about preserving the British empire ("I did not become the King's first minister in order to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire"), limiting Russia's expansion into the Balkans and thus preserving traditional British influence in that tragic land. Roosevelt had less interest in any one particular area than in resurrecting the *status quo* in order to provide a market for the vastly expanded productive machine in the U.S. This in turn led to active U.S. assistance to the British, French and Dutch in re-establishing their dying empires. Each for democracy, yes, but each meant a different thing when it came to the Poles, Hungarians, Yugoslavs, Greeks, Egyptians, Arabs, Indians, Indonesians and Chinese. It all depended on who was in the saddle.

Social Struggle

But they all seemed to agree on Germany. Germany was to be denazified, deindustrialized, demilitarized and divided; it was to be prevented forever from ever threatening the peace. As it turned out, the victors took that task upon themselves. When it became apparent that the falling out of the wartime allies had developed into a deep-seated ideological and political struggle between irreconcilable social systems—capitalism and a totalitarian collectivism—each side began to

develop its sector of Germany as an appendage to the now-forming military blocs bristling at one another across the Iron Curtain. Thus in a space of ten years Germany has risen to the position of the third most powerful industrial nation and a German army is in creation on both sides of the Elbe.

A Total Cold War

If the struggle for power in Europe and for control of Europe's resources were merely of the traditional kind, between have and have-not nations or the expansion for markets or spheres of influence, then there would be much justification in believing that some sort of *modus vivendi* could be reached delimiting the area of conflict, each having a sphere where the right (sic) to exploit the weaker nations and peoples would be recognized by the respective powers. The fact that this is a conflict of mutually hostile social systems has to be emphasized. This means that the cold war struggle is at once ideological, political, philosophical, social and commercial as well as military. The resultant is a state of affairs where the mere existence of one rival social system, in and of itself, creates and poses a challenge to the other. Anything short of this would have made the last decade less demoralizing. That there has not been a war has been due almost entirely to the nature of the destructive weapons which have evolved.

It is more important to understand the dynamic of this rivalry than to keep score on which side is more aggressive or more on the defensive in each case. The dynamic of Communism is that it claims to be a historically progressive society, and it utilizes the democratic clan of socialism to both justify and explain away the despotism inherent in Communist rule. That in itself would not be sufficient if it were not opposed by the capitalist order. Although claiming to be the repository of freedom and opportunity, the ruling classes in bourgeois society are more interested in their own profit and wealth and the preservation of their privileged position than in the defense and extension of democracy.

Stalemate in Struggle

Some have sought to explain the paradox of a totalitarian society being more dynamic in its policies while the more democratic capitalism in the U.S. and Western Europe is constantly on the defensive by the fact that Russia is totalitarian, and therefore it is capable of the utmost flexibility while the US is responsible to public opinion. While this is true, it falls into the category of reasons that explain very little. Basically the answer has to be sought in the fact that the Stalinist regimes seek to overturn the *status quo* in the old capitalist world, while the U.S. is trying to preserve crumbling empires and the old forms of exploitation. Admittedly there are many historic subtleties which have to be added to the picture, but the above reason is fundamental.

The post-war years in Europe have been building toward the present stalemate. The postwar race toward the consolidation of power on both sides of the Iron Curtain has concluded, or rather has gone as far as it could go. There is no longer a belief that Communism is the wave of the future capable of winning millions to its banners even in the relatively democratic countries of Western Europe. The Communist tide has receded in West Europe and stabilized itself at a level far short of being a contender for power. On the other side, the race to rebuild the economies of Western

Europe has proceeded to the point midway between cutting the ground of Stalinist appeal and far short of justice and well-being which is the right of every man. The Marshall Plan was a success, it re-established the status quo. But it could only produce a stalemate, and no more. On the other side of the Iron Curtain, Russia has thus far successfully resisted all attempts to through off Communist rule in its satellites. Simultaneously, it is pushing forward plans to further integrate East Europe into the Russian economy.

The only other element which must be accounted for is a question of the problem created by NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It is no longer a question of armies of men, planes and tanks but nuclear weapons and intercontinental missiles. If we are to believe the protagonists of either camp, the rival's military forces are poised just waiting for the most advantageous moment to launch an all-out attack. Perhaps there is an element of truth in this simple picture but the consequences of such a war are so great that they make the outbreak of general war more the result of accidental factor than a deliberately conscious move. Nevertheless the nuclear possibility of holocaust continues.

Hungary and Peace

The Hungarian Revolution was the catalyst which crystallized much of the present thinking about disengagement. Even before that landmark in the struggle for freedom, there were those who called for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Europe, not out of sympathy with Russian aims, but precisely because they believed that the presence of those forces provided much of the justification for the Russian occupation and enslavement of Eastern Europe. Far better, it was argued, for the European peoples to organize their own defense, to whatever extent necessary, rather than become emmeshed in a military alliance whose only consequence was to heighten every military danger and which would prove incapable of providing any political initiative to work out a policy of peace with freedom.

But, went the standard reply, what about Russia? While Stalin or his successor might hesitate to launch a nuclear war, what about the huge Russian armies supported by the additional forces of the East European satellites? Remove U.S. troops and the Russian and East European armies would come pouring into Western Europe, or else apply such pressures that West Europe would soon sink into the status of Russian satellites too. First East Berlin, then Poland and finally Hungary completely devastated that thesis. Russia far from being able to launch a war to devour new territories had more important difficulties in trying to reconsolidate its rule over millions of resentful peoples. East Europe instead of being a military asset actually was a liability which neutralized much of Russian strength. After Hungary many doubts about the Nato strategy were translated into a feeling that a new way must be found which would at the same time break the military stalemate and provide an opening whereby there might be some hope for the people of East Europe to win their freedom. These twin objectives form the core of much of the motivation for the disengagement policy.

The differences between the disengagement policy in its broadest terms and the official government policies in the Western capitals can essentially be summarized as follows: the disengagement advocates believe that a new political ini-

tiative must be developed to break the military deadlock that divides Europe and threatens war, that some means must be found to weaken the grip of Russia over East Europe and offer hope to the captive peoples; the official policy, as often stated by John Foster Dulles and Dean Acheson, is to maintain the military status quo and grimly to await the day of the inevitable collapse of Communist power.

The result of this near-exclusive military orientation has been one political and propaganda disaster after another for the U.S. It has enabled the Kremlin to propose all kinds of conferences and negotiations to alter and change the existing relationships, and even to be bold enough to make the proposal for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from European countries fully aware that Washington's policy prevents it from making a similar propagandistic bluff, much less to call Khrushchev's bluff. The immediate reasons for this seemingly incredible rigidity follows from the military orientation of Western policy. Any negotiations which seem to offer even a temporary relaxation of tensions or to call for a modification of the present American military posture is seen as subverting Europe's willingness to continue economic sacrifices for arms expenditures. And this in turn emboldens the Kremlin to seize the political initiative time after time, to propose all kinds of conferences, and thus to appear as the champions of peace which they most certainly are not.

Cold-War Paradox

This brings us back to the paradox of the cold war dynamic mentioned earlier. Examining the respective position of both sides in the most objective way possible, it has to be observed that Russia's basic positions are every bit as rigid, if not more rigid than those of the U.S. And there is no better example of this than Germany.

When Khrushchev made the demand last November that West Berlin be removed from Western Occupation and converted into a free city, the Kremlin once again seized the initiative in seeking (on its own terms, of course) a halt in the rearming of West Germany. The reply of the Western Allies was prompt and unequivocal—the West Berlin proposal was completely unacceptable. Moscow then proposed a peace treaty which would effectively neutralize Germany, reduce its military forces to a police level and provide for a Confederation of the existing German states. In turn Washington has replied that a peace treaty must provide for the reunification of both German states based on free election, and the right of the United Germany to choose any foreign policy it wished, namely to remain in NATO. In effect both proposals did the following: Russia demanded the withdrawal of Germany from Nato while preserving its satellite's rule in the eastern part of the confederation; the U.S. was equally modest, since all it wanted was for Moscow to give up the Ulbricht regime and allow the united Germany to join NATO, thus pushing Western military power further to the East.

It is obvious that what both proposals have in common is a disregard for the rights of the German people; and each is carefully tailored to meet the respective interests of the big powers. The anchor of U.S. policy is the determination to keep Germany in NATO; for the Kremlin it is to preserve Communist rule.

It must be admitted that it is possible, though not without some difficulties, for Germany to abandon its NATO orien-

tation without any serious consequences for the fabric of Western society. But the same does not hold true for the preservation of Communist rule in East Germany. Any peace treaty which, even if it meets the objective of getting Germany out of NATO, also allows the German people to make a free choice over the type of government and society they want, means the end of Communist rule in Germany. And that would have far-reaching and serious consequences for the Kremlin in all of East Europe. This is the reason why Moscow has resisted and will continue its unalterable opposition to any proposal for free elections.

Will Russia Withdraw?

The net effect of this equation is to make the Russian position extremely rigid and therefore vulnerable to a certain kind of proposal. But this can be done only through the willingness to abandon the military determinants that motivate Washington and Western policy. The virtue of George Kennan's writings on disengagement is that they have most clearly pointed out some of the implications of why it is necessary to break the military deadlock and the European stalemate. Merely to repeat the formula for free elections and at the same time demand the extension of NATO power as the U.S. has done is not only poor propaganda but it provides the loopholes through which the Kremlin can slip out of its reactionary position of denying the most elementary democratic rights to the East European peoples. As long as they can charge, and not without justification, that the U.S. seeks free elections as a cover for the extension of its military bloc, Khrushchev has a kind of rationale for their policy of opposing free elections.

The realities of Stalinist power and interests in East Europe make it difficult to conceive of circumstances under which the Kremlin would agree to a withdrawal of their military forces—especially from East Europe, as both Hugh Gaitskill and George Kennan assume—even with the withdrawal of Germany from NATO and the signing of a general European security pact. Communist rule is a function of the continued Russian occupation. But from this it does not follow that no change should be demanded of the U.S. nor that negotiations are meaningless or worthless.

Certain facts have to be recognized, the first of which is that the NATO orientation has proven to be bankrupt. It can neither create the preponderance of strength to force Russia to negotiate on Washington's terms, that is, to capitulate before Western military power, nor can it offer any hope to the peoples under Communist domination, as the Hungarian Revolution demonstrated.

Western policy is now in a *cul de sac*; it can neither force negotiations nor liberate—it can only step up the tempo of the arms race. While the proposal for the adoption of a program for the withdrawal of U.S. troops will not automatically solve the problems of a divided continent, it will certainly give hope that a solution can be found. It will release Europe from the crushing burden of armaments, and weaken the power of those reactionary forces who have most to gain from the armaments and seek to preserve their power through military means.

How much more can we ask for as a beginning?

SAM BOTTONE

Sam Bottone is an Editor of ANVIL.

Pasternak: Romantic Rebel

— A Subversive Integrity

THE PUBLICATION of Boris Pasternak's novel, *Doctor Zhivago* (Pantheon, \$5) is clearly a literary and political event. It marks the end of a twenty-five year silence in creative work of one of Russia's most interesting writers. It has been hailed by some as a further step in the development of that giant genre, the Russian novel, a book in the tradition of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. And there is, of course, the added irony that Pasternak's achievement appears first in translation while it is banned in the original Russian because of sins of "idealism" and "subjectivism."

All of these aspects are of interest, the political not least of all. Yet *Doctor Zhivago* must be ultimately evaluated as a work of the creative imagination, not as an analysis of Russian society. And here we are at something of a loss. We stand so close to this book, and our perspective upon it is made even more difficult because of all the non-aesthetic factors that mix in our attempted judgment. We cannot, then, be final; we can only make the most tentative beginnings of a criticism.

A Work of Art

But with all of these qualifications, one thing is plain: *Doctor Zhivago* makes its claim upon our imagination as a major work of art. It puts itself forth as an attempt to storm the literary heights, it demands comparison with the first rank of the novel. Perhaps it does not quite succeed in its high purpose—and that would be my own tentative feeling—yet there is an air of greatness about it. We can, and we should, seek within it insights into contemporary Russian society, particularly into the reactions of a sensitive intellectual to the stormy developments of the forty years since the October Revolution. But our real problem, our ultimate task, is the extremely complex one of trying to make a hesitant evaluation as to whether or not we are in the presence of a modern classic.

The critical reaction to *Dr. Zhivago* has been fascinating. Nicola Chiaromonte found it a work of the first rank in his *Partisan Review* article; V. S. Prichett, writing in the *New Statesman*, felt that it was serious and important even if somewhat undisciplined; Irving Howe wrote that *Dr. Zhivago* misses a Tolstoyan magnificence, though only barely, because the Russian society with which Pasternak deals is too grey; Lionel Abel, in a thoughtful discussion in *Dissent*, states that he believes the book fails as literature no matter how great it may seem in its political context; and Edmund Wilson, in a luminous essay in the *New Yorker* (the best discussion I have read) centers on the religious theme of life and resurrection. Yet strangely, all of these reactions—except, in many ways, Wilson's—miss what is perhaps the most striking thing about *Dr. Zhivago*: the fact that this is a novel in the romantic tradition.

The story is fairly simple. It opens with a panorama on pre-Revolutionary Russia, a series of rapid, contrasting vignettes of workers and intellectuals, of the corrupters and the

radicals. Out of this montage (and Prichett is right on this count: it lacks a certain discipline and severity), there emerge the central characters of the novel. Doctor Zhivago, the son of a millionaire profligate who commits suicide, is a doctor and poet. As time passes, he becomes involved in the maelstrom of war and revolution, finding in the midst of chaos his love for Lara, the wife of a non-Party leader of the Revolution, and then losing her. At the end of the major narrative, Zhivago dies of a heart attack—trying to open a window on a trolley which he does not realize is nailed down. Yet his poetry survives, and his memory is a force not simply among his friends but among many Russian intellectuals.

This is the plot—and it is clearly of subordinate concern for Pasternak. The point of the book, the vision which informs it and is the criterion of choosing to present this or that scene, is a romantic view of the world. This is best expressed in "The Poems of Yurii Zhivago" which forms an appendix to the novel itself. In one of them Pasternak writes,

*And yet, the order of the facts has been schemed and plotted,
And nothing can avert the final curtain's fall.
I stand alone. All else is swamped by Pharisaism.
To live life to the end is not a childish task.*

Or, in an even more revealing poem, "Fairy Tale," Pasternak tells the legend of a Knight and Princess who, the dragon slain,

*Strain to come to,
Only to sleep again.*

And then he closes with a most important image:

*Tightly closed eyelids.
Towering heights. And clouds.
Waters. Fords. And Rivers.
Years. And countless ages.*

Here is the very stuff of romanticism, its poignant sense of process, of time passing, of the individual being gathered up into something larger than himself.

Nature, Fate and Process

The images of the poems are not an accident: they are integral to the book. When Zhivago dies, for example, he is thinking of how time is relative, how people pass each other in the midst of life, cross paths, and that sometimes one who has forged ahead will fall and another will come from behind to go beyond him. This meditation is accompanied by a marvelous description of a sweating woman who is walking alongside of the trolley fanning herself with papers. Zhivago passed her years before. Now, as he dies, she walks beyond him—eventually, we are told, to her own tragic end. Indeed, *Doctor Zhivago* constantly violates the canons of realism in order to develop a sense of fate. There are fortuitous meetings throughout the novel whose justification cannot come from a vision of natural chronology. Rather, they derive from the poetic conception of fate at the heart of the book.

And then, there is Pasternak's constant recourse to the

pathetic fallacy. *Dr. Zhivago* is literally filled with sections in which the action of the plot is imitated by nature. At one point, for instance, Zhivago is riding alone and a nightingale begins to sing:

'Wake up! Wake up!' it called persuasively; it sounded almost like the summons on the eve of Easter Sunday: 'Awake, O my soul, why dost thou slumber?' Suddenly Yurii Andreievich was struck by a very simple thought. What was the hurry.

Here, it is the nightingale which actually is the motivation that Pasternak gives for Zhivago's change of heart. Indeed, the most persistent images used to describe the revolution itself are those of nature. A field heavy with unharvested wheat and crawling with bloated mice is Pasternak's image of Russia in the wake of civil war:

Deserted by man, the fields looked orphaned as if his absence had put them under a curse. The forest, however, well rid of him, flourished proudly in freedom as though released from captivity.

The Revolution as a Storm

In this context, I think it is a mistake to argue, as Lionel Abel does, that Pasternak does not measure up to the task of presenting the revolution. In *Dr. Zhivago*, there is a fundamental image of October: as a bursting forth of elemental process that sets loose forces which overwhelm those who try to control them. This may be inadequate as a theory of the Russian revolution and the subsequent Stalinist counter-revolution (I certainly feel this to be the case), but that is not to condemn it as the basic image of a work of art. For Pasternak takes this abstract half-truth of the elemental quality of a social upheaval and makes it the means of illuminating many other truths. The picture of the exhaustion, the hunger, the spiritual complexity of the revolution which he conveys in his image of a train ride across Russia, or the privations of a group of forest partisans is truly unforgettable. It is not, to be sure, a rounded statement on the Revolution as a political event; but it is a magnificent perspective upon the Revolution in its human workings.

This fundamental vision of Pasternak is beautifully stated in one of the central passages of the book. Zhivago is thinking:

He reflected again that he conceived of history, of what is called the course of history, not in the accepted way but by analogy with the vegetable kingdom. In winter, under the snow, the leafless branches of a wood are thin and poor, like the hairs on an old man's wart. But in only a few days in spring the forest is transformed, it reaches the clouds, and you can hide or lose yourself in its leafy maze. This transformation is achieved with a speed greater than in the case of animals, for animals do not grow as fast as plants, and yet we cannot directly observe the movement of growth even of plants. The forest does not change its place, we cannot lie in wait for it and catch it in the act of change. Whenever we look at it, it seems to be motionless. And such also is the immobility to our eyes of the eternally growing, ceaselessly changing history, the life of society moving invisibly in its incessant transformations. . . . History cannot be seen, just as one cannot see grass growing.

As sociology, this is certainly less than adequate; but it is not sociology. *Dr. Zhivago* is not a theory of the organic character of history, as in Spengler, it is a novel. And this vision of history as grass growing is the stuff of real imaginative truth; it allows insights into the individual human meanings of history that will forever escape the social scientist.

And yet, Pasternak's romantic image has very real drawbacks. For one thing (and Lionel Abel is particularly fine on

this point), the worth of the individual which is affirmed as a value throughout *Dr. Zhivago* is, in the actual course of the novel, made subordinate to the romantic vision of process, of time passing, of the seed bursting beneath the snow. Thus it is that the love affair between Zhivago and Lara is not a felt achievement of the novelist. It is, as romantic versions of love so often are, a relation which we are told is profound but which we do not really see as so important. Perhaps this is a function of the fact that Pasternak is a poet, and that he uses here a more poetical conception of form than a novelistic one.

But, however we view it, this abstract, prophetic character of *Zhivago* is a loss. In *War and Peace*, for instance, Tolstoy puts forward images of nature which are somewhat like those of Pasternak. When Andre is lying on the field of battle, he looks up at the sky and feels an immense and lovely peace. Yet Tolstoy integrates this mysticism into a carefully structured work of art. Pasternak's poetry, his mysticism, escapes his fictional discipline. And this means that *Dr. Zhivago* presents us with a complex problem of judgment. On the one hand, there is the magnificent vision, leading to all kinds of insights into the people and the Revolution; on the other hand, this over-all view dominates the entire plot, and it too often dwarfs the characters.

Then there is the difficult question: how is it that the reaction to Stalinism of a brilliant and gifted Russian poet takes the aesthetic form of Romanticism?

Complexities of Romanticism

The European romanticism of the nineteenth century was a peculiarly complex movement. On the one hand it often identified with the forward thrust of society, even with radicalism. Thus, for example, Shelley and his attitudes toward religious freedom, the emancipation of woman and the like. But, on the other hand, it was a reactionary radicalism in the literal sense of the word. That is, it reacted to the misery and deformations of industrial capitalism by projecting an image of a happy past, often enough of feudalism. It fled the social issue and took refuge in the countryside, sometimes speaking in the name of the happy peasant.

When we talk of Pasternak as a Romantic we cannot, of course, imply a literal repetition of this tendency. For one thing, the author of *Dr. Zhivago* does not live in the bourgeois nineteenth century but in post-Stalin Russia; for another, his novel does not support such a theory. *Zhivago* ends with a real hope, albeit a hope in process rather than in politics, of the exhaustion of the storm and of the inevitable coming of the calm. Significantly, the book closes on a summer evening, in a time of the mellowing and softness of nature. Two characters sit with a book of Zhivago's poems:

Thinking of this holy city and of the entire earth, of the still living protagonists of this story, and their children, they were filled with tenderness and peace, and they were enveloped by the unheard music of happiness that flowed all about them and into the distance. And the book they held seemed to confirm and encourage their feeling.

And yet, even with this optimism, there are too many similarities between *Zhivago* and the writers of the romantic tradition to ignore. The fatalism, the sense of process, the nature mysticism, the retreat, the concern with existence, and the other qualities already mentioned are the stuff of Romanticism and spring, like it, from a sense of rejection. But

the pessimism, the feeling of death upon the midnight, is missing since the ultimate value of Pasternak is the affirming, creating character of life itself.

In this *Dr. Zhivago* is to be sharply differentiated from much of the literature which came out of the Hungarian Revolution, or even from the Russian "thaw." Tibor Derey or Dudintsev are completely and consciously political. They concentrate upon the immediate problems of bureaucracy, of political cruelty and totalitarianism. Perhaps Pasternak has gone deeper. For he attempts to find within the political events of his life the form and substance of ultimate values. This is not to say, of course, that *Dr. Zhivago* is unconcerned with politics—that is literally impossible for any Russian writer these days. It is rather to argue that Pasternak has attempted to analyze and feel the events of his life on the most profound level open to him—and that this attempt raises the issue of the very meaning of life and of history.

Edmund Wilson's Insight

It is in this context that we might refer to Edmund Wilson's brilliant *New Yorker* essay. Wilson is magnificently right in realizing that the real center of *Dr. Zhivago* is transcendental and religious, not political (or, inasmuch as it is political, it is a critique of the anti-humanism of both capitalist and Communist society). And yet, we might go on and add that this religious sense has a certain form. It is not, as is Dostoevsky's or Tolstoy's Christianity, political, an inspiration for the reconstruction of the world. Rather, it is passive, it has a distance from all politics. In this, the romantic tendency toward rejection and removal from the social sphere is emphasized, and here is another dimension of this huge work of art.

In reacting to these aspects of *Dr. Zhivago*, most of us will have to overcome our prejudices with regard to Romanticism. After all, we live in the wake of an anti-romantic revolution, even though its Robespierre, the incorruptible Mr. Eliot, appears to have been mellowed by time rather than executed. As a result, our generation has developed a considerable antipathy to the themes which are central to Pasternak. We would prefer, perhaps, a little more irony, a little more inhibition and analysis.

Beyond this, there is the further possibility of a foolish political prejudice. Some might be tempted to stand "socialist" realism on its head and to hope that the Russian writing which is produced in freedom will present good, solid, democratic socialist values. It is hard to imagine a more wrong-headed attitude. The creativity which will develop in a liberated Russia, the creativity which has managed to survive in an imprisoned Russia, may well turn to anti-political approaches, to non-representationalism and romanticism. Realism, after all, must bear all of the unjustly acquired onus which the Communist literary apparatus has imposed upon it.

In this context, *Dr. Zhivago's* romanticism is a testimony to the irrepressible integrity of the artistic impulse. Here is one of the greatest talents of Russia, a poet who found the Revolution an occasion for experiment and radicalism, and the counter-Revolution a time for silence. After twenty-five years, he breaks the quiet, and his work is suffused with romanticism, with aesthetically fecund mysticism, with a search for deep and ultimate values. This could well mean that the

liberation of the Russian intellect will produce one of the greatest arts the world has known, that the gigantic leap of the nineteenth century which we see in a Tolstoy and a Dostoevsky will be repeated again in our time.

It is interesting in this context to note that the Russian totalitarians have attempted to evade almost all of the really central themes of the novel. For one thing they cannot understand is the apolitical character of *Dr. Zhivago*. There has been, of course, the usual outright slander and villification, the charges that Pasternak "poisons" the atmosphere of "socialism." But a more serious attempt to deal with *Zhivago*, the rejection letter sent Pasternak by the editors of *Novy Mir*, is even more interesting. For their fundamental premise is that *Zhivago* is a "political novel-sermon," an attempt to deal with the historic significance of the October Revolution. Nothing could be further from the truth. The integrity of the book is, to be sure, an implicit attack upon Communist totalitarianism and its manipulated consciousness, but the major theme is individual, personal and religious. Thus the *Novy Mir* editors are forced to invent material to substantiate their charge. Over and over, they repeat that the characters are primarily motivated by "the measure of personal discomfort brought about by the Revolution." This is simply not substantiated by the book, and it demonstrates a handsome totalitarian ability to force a work of art into a political frame of reference when that is simply not the case.

The Alienation of Battle

Other comment, usually from those in the United States who are Communist or pro-Communist, has focused upon a battle scene where *Zhivago* feels sympathy for the advancing White Guard *individuals*. This, of course, is in the grand nineteenth century tradition of battle scenes (Stendahl's Napoleon in the midst of the conflict, Tolstoy's emphasis upon the lack of logical and consistent meanings in the midst of the actual carnage). It is also in keeping with *Zhivago's* fundamental premise, that of seeing the individual and the personal as it moves through history. Such a reaction is human, it expresses a profound value, and the outrage of those who are so offended by it (where it is not simply a function of their hatred for everything deemed "anti-Soviet") can only rest on a theory of art which would reject all that is complex in human reactions.

This romanticism, then, shares with its predecessor the quality of being anti-political. But more than that, it is witness to the survival of the spirit even under the conditions of totalitarianism, it sounds a depth of freedom—it is revolutionary.

Finally, how do we deal with *Zhivago*, not as art, but as social symptom?

First of all, one must marvel at the fact that the Russian censorship let the book get out of the country at all. For Pasternak is, in terms of the state theories of art now prevalent in Russia, an utterly subversive writer. It is not only that he defends values which are antithetical to those of the official ideology. Far worse, he writes of human beings in their emotions in a way which is the very rejection of all the patterns which the apparatus demands. Like the hero of Orwell's *1984*, he makes love a focus of individual affirmation against the claims of the state, or has a Social Revolutionary describe the peasant:

When the revolution woke him up, he decided that his century-

old dream was coming true—his dream of living on his own land by the work of his hands, in complete independence and with no obligations to anyone. Instead, he found he had only exchanged the oppression of the former state for the new, much harsher yoke of the revolutionary superstate.

The specifically political passages, like this comment upon the peasantry, are, from the point of view of the totalitarians, bad enough. But, we must repeat, the real danger is in the innate subversiveness of true art itself. In this context, Pasternak's Romanticism is a revolutionary art form for, whatever its other aspects, it has an uncompromising integrity at its very center. Here again, a fact which emerged so clearly in the Hungarian Revolution is obvious: that any freedom in a totalitarian society is dangerous; that it begins a revolutionary dialectic. In Budapest, the first overt signs of resistance began, we will remember, with discussions on "socialist" realism at the Petofi Circle. From this, the discussion moved in a clear line to politics. So also with Pasternak. To allow this Romanticism, as the censors eventually realized, is to admit a center of intellectual and spiritual opposition to the regime. This could not be tolerated, and the state attempted to recall the manuscript of *Dr. Zhivago*.

Secondly, the form of Pasternak's political opposition is quite interesting. Its aesthetic importance has already been noted, but there is also the dimension of social protest. In this regard, a recent poll taken in Poland is illuminating. There it was discovered that the students were opposed to "Marxism," but in favor of socialism. I put "Marxism" in quotes, because I assume that the opposition was not to the tradition of democratic humanism as embodied in Marx, but rather to the crude Stalinized version of the Polish Communist state. Similarly with Pasternak. In *Dr. Zhivago*, the doctor rejects the pretensions of Marxism (read, Stalinism) to

be an exact science. He counterposes to this theory his own affirmation of life.

The significance of this, like the social background of Pasternak's Romanticism, is that we can expect intellectual opposition to Communism to take many forms, some of them phrased in terms of rejecting values like Marxism. When dealing with these tendencies, we will always have to go behind them, understanding that terms developed in Communist society are quite different from the conceptions we have. It is an idle and sterile sectarianism to expect the anti-Communist movement within the Communist countries to develop according to the rhythms and rhetoric of the West. It will have its peculiarities—many of them are apparent in Pasternak—it will take surprising forms, but the fundamental thing, so visible in *Dr. Zhivago*, will always be the thrust for freedom.

Doctor Zhivago, then, is the work of a Romantic revolutionary. Its romanticism is the recoil of a sensitive intellect from the total character of politics in Communist society and this is understandable, even encouraging. Its revolutionary character resides in its searing honesty, its thirst for freedom. It is too early for us to measure this book as a work of art. Its vision of man, of process, is powerful and compelling, sometimes too much so, for it swallows up the characters whose individuality is being affirmed. Yet, with whatever inadequacies and however complex the problems which it presents, Pasternak's book is one of the most important literary and political products of the post-war period.

For here, both freedom and genius are at work.

MICHAEL HARRINGTON

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The Crisis of British Labor

— *Whose Welfare State?*

THE BRITISH political scene is currently dominated by the prospect of a general election in the near future. Although the five-year term of office of the second post-war Tory Government does not expire until May, 1960, all the external evidence indicates that Prime Minister Macmillan will send the voters to the polling booths sometime next year, possibly in the spring or autumn months. This factor, which is common knowledge in all political circles, has had a profound effect on the public and private attitudes of both the Tory and Labor Parties and their respective leaders and has determined the direction of their activities during the past few months and will continue to do so in the immediate future.

The initiative and advantage in the present situation rests distinctly with the Tory Party, and thus contrasts sharply with the position which existed only twelve months ago. Then the Tory Party had reached rock bottom. The Suez adventure; a tight economic policy and dissension in its own ranks—primarily among its middle-class supporters as a consequence of their worsening economic position—had pushed the Tory Party to the lowest position in the public polls conducted by the newspapers, demoralized its active workers and reduced its chances of winning a general election to almost zero. Recently, however, the tide has turned again to favor the Tories. Suez is over and forgotten by a large section of the population; the later intervention in Lebanon has likewise dropped from the public mind; the government's economic policy—relative to its toughest point last autumn—is now decidedly easier; the middle-class Tory rebels, confronted with the reality that their activities could bring about the downfall of their government, have allowed their revolt to fizzle out; Tory Party morale is climbing high again; and the newspaper pollsters report that popular support for the government is returning.

Tory Party on Offensive

Prime Minister Macmillan and his party managers are therefore in a comfortable position. No longer are they faced with the prospect of being forced to call a general election, on the grounds that their support in the country has vanished, at a time most unfavorable to themselves. Instead they can bide their time a little and arrange the election to take place at the moment they consider their chances of winning are at a maximum, and recent events indicate that they are using this breathing space to increase their chances of re-election. They believe, and probably correctly, that if they can succeed in defeating the Labor Party for the third time in succession they will precipitate a crisis of the gravest magnitude within the ranks of British and European Socialism and confront the Labor Party with a situation as critical as that which followed the 1931 general election when Labor's representation in Parliament was slashed from 287 to 46.

The general aim of the Tory Party appears to be to use this period immediately prior to the general election to convince the electorate, particularly the working class voters, that

it has turned its back on the past. It is seeking to create in the public mind an image of a new Tory Party which is progressive, humanistic, efficient and firmly wedded to the ideas of the Welfare State. To this end Macmillan has recently been sent on tour around the country; not so much to make speeches but to kiss the babies, drop in at the local pub for a beer, visit the factories and chat with workers and to generally behave in a friendly, but slightly paternalistic, fashion. At the Tory Party annual conference, held in Blackpool recently, the party leaders went out of their way to damp down the voices of their extreme right wing on the floor and to smother the demands for a return to judicial flogging, alterations in the law on capital punishment, legislation against the trade unions and similar reactionary measures. Immediately after the conference the government released its plans—in large part copied from a policy statement adopted by the Labor Party at its 1957 conference—for extending the area of Welfare Statism by introducing a scheme of national superannuation under which all workers will receive pensions at the age of 65 in proportion to their earning while at work. In fact, the Tory Party is endeavoring to tell the public that it is possible to have an efficiently managed Welfare State without having a Labor Government which, say the Tories, is bogged down in a lot of old fashioned ideas about Socialism and in which it no longer believes in any case.

This change in the Tory Party fortunes, coupled with its ever growing confidence, has set a problem for the Labor Party—or, more particularly, the Labor Party leadership. Until recently the Labor Party could rely largely on the widespread anti-Tory feelings of the public to do most of its work; all that was necessary was to direct hard and ruthless criticism at those points of Tory policy which were causing the greatest annoyance either to the population generally or easily defined sectors of it. Now this largely negative attitude is more of a liability than an asset, the public is more interested in hearing what the Labor Party proposes to do if it becomes the government party rather than listen to its criticisms of aspects of Tory government policy—particularly when these aspects of policy are now history in the public mind, as is Suez and the high bank rate. The Labor Party has therefore been forced, by external events, to switch its activities into a more positive direction.

That such a situation would arise was not unforeseen by the Labor Party leadership, and for the past three years subcommittees of the National Executive have been preparing lengthy policy documents on a variety of subjects. Ten in number, these documents have been presented to annual conferences for discussion by the delegates and subsequent endorsement as plans of action for the next Labor government. The process is now complete and, theoretically at least, it is possible for the Labor Party to spell out in some detail what positive measures it will undertake on being returned as the majority party.

Unfortunately, the plan seems to have gone adrift. Al-

though the policy documents, some of them running into more than a hundred pages of printed matter, have been discussed—after a fashion—at party conferences, occasionally modified in the light of debates, and been adopted as forming Labor's policy, their impact upon the public has been negligible. While the main activity of the Labor Party was directed to criticizing aspects of current Tory policy, in line with the general public feeling, this deficiency passed largely unnoticed; but now that the Labor Party is in a position where it must rely upon its own program for public interest the deficiency is glaringly apparent.

"Too Damned Dull"

Many reasons have been advanced for the public's lack of interest in Labor's program. By some it is claimed that whilst the political content of the program is good, its technical presentation in the policy documents is poor and incapable of being understood by the man in the street. They are "too damned dull" was how *Forward*, a right-of-center weekly Laborite journal, summed it up in a banner headline recently and earned for its pains a rebuke from Morgan Phillips, the national secretary of the Party. Others point to the fact that only a small minority of the Labor Party activists have studied the policy documents—so how can it be expected that they will become topics of conversation among the ordinary voters? This view, incidentally, received some support when at the recent annual conference of the Party a political columnist conducted a private poll among delegates and discovered that out of a dozen delegates questioned most had not read a single policy document and the rest had read three; "This is not good enough," was the comment of Labor Party officials!

Cutting away from these two attitudes there is a third which says the trouble rests in the fact that the policies advanced in the documents are insufficiently radical to capture the interest of the public. This point of view usually says that the policy documents are good so far as they go—but they don't go far enough and many of them hardly move from the point reached in the years 1945-51 when the Labor Party laid the foundations of the present Welfare State. Recently the Labor Party itself made a statement which, beyond doubt without deliberate intention, appears to reinforce this point of view.

In *Talking Points*, an official Party bulletin, the statement was made that Labor deserves to win the next election because it had set out important and correct policies which it would follow when returned as the government. "The strongest evidence of the appeal of these carefully worked out policies of ours," it continued, "is the relentless way the Conservatives have been stealing them." It apparently did not occur to the Party leadership when it allowed this statement to pass for publication that it was admitting either, a) the Labor Party policy documents were so right-wing that the Tory Party could steal them and still remain a party with a capitalist ideology, or b) that the Tory Party had moved so far to the left that it could steal Socialist policies and, as a corollary to either of these statements, c) there was no longer any need for a Tory Party and a Labor Party, they had reached the point where they could fuse into common organization with a mutually agreed policy.

The fact that a statement with such implications could originate from the Labor Party headquarters gives an indica-

tion of the thinking which now dominates the Party leadership. No longer is the conflict between the Labor Party and the Tory Party posed in terms of Socialism and capitalism, but rather as a dispute between rival managers who both claim that they can most efficiently conduct the affairs of the Welfare State, and in such circumstances the argument as to who thought of a particular line of policy first becomes of paramount importance when seeking the votes of the electorate.

With such a general attitude governing the Labor Party, and with the knowledge that a general election cannot now be long delayed, it is understandable that the unity of the organization should be the dominant demand of the Party leadership; and this was demonstrated at the Labor Party annual conference a few weeks ago in much the same fashion as it was at the Tory Party conference. Whereas at the Tory conference every effort was made to negate the voice of the right-wing and thus appear before the workers as a "progressive" party, at the Labor conference every effort was made to dampen down the voice of the left-wing and thus appear before the middle-class as a "responsible" party. Playing a prominent role in demonstrating the unity of the Party was the one-time leader of its left-wing, Nye Bevan—who again took the lead in opposing a demand that Britain unilaterally end H-bomb tests and manufacture. Perhaps the most telling comment on the conference was that which appeared in *Talking Points* (the Labor bulletin referred to previously). Reporting on the debate on agriculture, at which a document entitled "Prosper and Plough" was put forward by the platform and countered by the demand from the floor it should have written into it a proposal that rented agricultural land should be nationalized, *Talking Points* said: "The large measure of agreement that land should not be nationalized and 'Prosper and Plough' be adopted brought unity, though hardly dynamic. The statement, as Dick Crossman said for the Executive, is a cautious and prosaic one." Thus, on the admission of an official Labor Party publication, unity, caution and dullness were given priority over a dynamic approach. But, adds *Talking Points* by way of compensation, "Prosper and Plough" is "a workmanlike approach to agricultural problems."

All Things to All Men 6

The admitted approach of the Labor Party leadership to agricultural problems is characteristic of its approach to most problems. Wishing the Labor Party to be all things to all men, the leadership prefers policies which err on the side of caution and dullness rather than on those which, though perhaps more dynamic in approach, are liable to alienate the middle-class vote upon which it is relying to gain control at the next election. This approach is reciprocated in part by the Tory Party, which in turn wishes to avoid policies which may alienate the workers, particularly the higher paid skilled workers, and thus rob it of the chance of winning power for the third time in succession. Britain is thus witnessing the spectacle of the two large parties moving towards one another in an ideological coalition and with argument between the parties being confined largely, though not at this stage entirely, to points of detailed management.

Just how far this process will go is dependent upon a variety of factors, the development of which cannot at this

stage be forecast with any degree of accuracy. If the Labor Party wins the next election, for instance, it could be that the following years will see a countervailing movement as the Labor Party as a whole regains some of its lost confidence as a consequence of being faced with government power for five years. In such a situation the left forces within the Labor Party, which at the moment are torpid, might exert themselves with some degree of rapidity to bring about a leftward turn. On the other hand, if the Tories win the next election it is distinctly possible that the leadership of the Labor Party would move even further over to the right in an endeavor to broaden its base into a "national party" and with the charac-

teristics of the old Liberal Party; if this happened the strains within the party—between its right and left wing—might well be stretched to near breaking point. In any event, if the Tories do succeed in gaining a majority for the third time in succession there is little doubt that they will, as stated earlier, have precipitated a crisis within the Labor Party the outcome of which will have profound consequences for Socialism and Socialist thought, not only in Britain but throughout the world.

BERNARD DIX

Bernard Dix is an active member of the Labor Party.

When the Contract Stopped

— UAW on the Defensive

AFTER JUNE 1, 1958, THE UNITED AUTOWORKERS union membership in General Motors, Ford and Chrysler worked without a contract for several months. A unique experience in labor relations ended when the Big Three and the UAW signed this fall.

Walter P. Reuther, UAW president, and his associates seemed somewhat surprised last May when contract expiration dates rolled around, and the Big Three stood firmly in their insistence that the union ought to be satisfied with an extension of the then current contracts for two more years. The offer included a minimum basic raise of 6 cents per hour under the "annual" improvement factor concept in previous contracts, and also a two cents per hour increase to cover the rising cost of living. The latter raise came from the operation of the "escalator" clause which ties wages to the cost of living.

The Contract Lapses

Given the acute problems of automation, decentralization, work standards fights (known as speed-up struggles), the plight of the pensioners, and the vast unemployment problem scarcely touched by the limited character of the operation of the Supplementary Unemployment Compensation plan, Walter Reuther and his colleagues found it impossible to accept a renewal of the contracts, without facing widespread repercussions in the union. Nor could the UAW afford to allow its reputation to suffer from such a modest solution to its contract problems.

On the other hand, the UAW recognized the difficulty if not impossibility of conducting a strike at a time when the auto industry was over-loaded with an 850,000 car inventory, and the general economic and political climate seemed strategically unfavorable. In that context, revival of an old coal miners union slogan, "no contract, no work," died aborning, for it meant in reality an unwanted strike.

Reuther outlined the dilemma of the UAW at a nationwide gathering of the General Motors, Ford and Chrysler conference delegates. He proposed as his solution the idea of working without a contract. Incidentally, in his two hour speech there was no reference to his "profit-sharing" plan,

which had always been considered by "insiders" as an expendable item on the bargaining agenda.

General acceptance of Reuther's proposal signified that the union would enter uncharted waters. What followed is not only interesting in itself but provides a basis for understanding the outcome of the deadlock between the UAW and the Big Three. Reuther didn't want a strike. Actually neither did the Big Three, as they indicated thereafter. Without a contract, the Big Three did not have to, at least in theory, recognize the union shop, collect dues under the check-off system, pay half the hospitalization and Blue Cross, or recognize the in-plant bargaining structures which have been the heart and soul of the UAW since its inception. In practice, the Big Three maintained all fringe benefits, and sought an in-plant relationship more favorable to the companies. In a word, it sought to cut the UAW down to size, without actually seeking to break the union.

At General Motors, the time allotted for in-plant bargaining representatives was reduced from maximum to minimum hours; Ford cut union representatives' time in half, that is, to four hours; at Chrysler, scene of a thousand and one speed-up fights in these months, the corporation ordered chief stewards to work six hours a day and plant committeemen three hours daily. These unilateral actions of the Big Three, which were not expected by the UAW brass, caused discontent and rebellion of various degrees for in-plant full time bargaining had been a feature of the UAW for years. The union membership had given up wage increases many years ago so that their plant bargainers could service them full time from company funds allotted for that purpose.

Apparently at General Motors and Ford, the plant union representatives expected some kind of move and they grumbled but went along. In Chrysler, where both the top UAW leadership and plant representatives expected a status quo, a blow up took place. Stewards and committeemen took the company head-on, even though in a few days over 312 chief stewards in the Chrysler empire were penalized for not obeying the new company rules. A special gathering of 600

local union officials in the Chrysler set-up was called in protest against this turn of events, for nothing in Reuther's speech had prepared them for this eventuality. It was a stormy four hour meeting marked by caustic criticism of Reuther, who failed to appear, and which ended by the International Union ordering the secondary leaders to obey policy.

Chrysler Cracks Down

In Chrysler's Automotive Body division, once known as Briggs, the company went further. It eliminated over 100 chief stewards, and tried to force the Local Union 212 to pick a restricted list of representatives. The Local refused to be trapped into taking that kind of responsibility and, in the Briggs set-up, there was no bargaining on the plant level after June 1st, with inevitable consequences, as we'll relate.

The shock effect on the rank and file in the plants wore off after one week of the new rules. The first impression that the Big Three would ride rough shod over the autoworkers changed when the ranks caught their breath. In many plants, the ranks took matters into their own hands. At the old Briggs plants, things got out of hand so far that a discussion ended in fist slinging, and a self-important superintendent went to the hospital. Wild-cats took place elsewhere. A kind of passive resistance developed in many plants. The pattern was uneven depending on the history and the character of the local union.

Without a union to bargain really for them in the plants on the important day-to-day grievances, the ranks grew tense, and worried and sore. It was reflected in a very unhappy development from a corporation standpoint. General Motors, Ford and Chrysler plants found themselves burdened with excessive repairs. In four GM plants rewards were posted for the reporting of "sabotage." The plain truth of the matter was that nobody cared, so that quantity replaced quality—an inevitable corollary of speed-up—and repair work on the Final OK line increased enormously.

A proper description for this development may be guerilla warfare on the assembly line. The UAW plant leaders really didn't control the ranks under the limitations placed by the new company rules: the ranks developed increasing hostility to the corporations, and at times, handfuls of embittered workers took matters in their own hands, and nobody was satisfied in the plants; the production men who had to live with the ranks, and the ranks who had to live with the line, and the union representatives who had to live with a situation they disliked intensely.

The Class Struggle

If it weren't almost verboten in union circles, and denied firmly by President Reuther time and again, we'd be inclined to suggest that a rather ordinary form of "class struggle" went on in the auto union during this period, and that increasing numbers of workers assumed anti-employer attitudes akin to class hatred. At an absolute minimum, the least rupture that took place in the thinking of the ranks was a suspicion of the companies and a staunch renewal of faith in unionism, if not in all union leaders. This was amply demonstrated to the chagrin of the Big Three when they saw how easy it was for the UAW to collect dues without a contract. The response of the ranks to voluntary dues collections surprised even some union officials who thought it would be a difficult task. Bu-

reaucratic mentality always has difficulty in understanding that when most ranks bitch about "high dues," they are not expressing dissatisfaction over money, but rather over inadequacies of union policy or mistrust of union leaders.

The refresher in the ABC's of unionism, and the rekindling of some spirit among the secondary leaders in the plants were worthwhile results of the shake-up, painful as it might have been. From top to bottom in the UAW, the end of the routine and business-as-usual attitudes may help arrest a bad case of middle-age spread. For few workers will forget the day the contract stopped—now that things are "normally" miserable again.

B. J. WIDDICK

B. J. Widdick is Chief Shop Steward in UAW Local 7.

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GET
AROUSÉ
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NOR DO I
NOR DO I

SAY
SOMETHING
TO
AROUSE
ME.

**MISSILE
MADNESS!**

MISSILE MADNESS.
YES, THAT'S A
GOOD ONE. THAT
CERTAINLY SHOULD
HAVE AROUSED
ME. BUT NO IT
DOESN'T.

**ATOMIC
HOLOCAUST!**

AH, THAT USED
TO BE A VERY
EFFECTIVE ONE.
YEARS AGO I
GOT AROUSED
ALL THE TIME
ON ATOMIC
HOLOCAUST.
BUT NOW—

**BRINKS-
MANSHIP!
GUNBOAT
DIPLOMACY!
QUEMOY!
MATSU!**

VERY GOOD. VERY GOOD.
FOR A MOMENT THERE
I ALMOST FELT AROUSED.
I GUESS ITS BECAUSE
THEY'RE SO CURRENT.

DO YOU THINK
WE'VE TURNED
APATHETIC?

APATHY IS SUCH A
BAD WORD. I'D HATE
TO THINK ITS
APATHY WE SUFFER
FROM.



LET'S JUST
CALL IT
FAITH.


I MET HIM AT A
PROTEST RALLY.
HE SEEMED A
LITTLE INNOCENT
POLITICALLY BUT
NEVERTHELESS
I LIKED HIM.

ON OUR FIRST
DATE WE SPENT
THE EVENING
DISCUSSING THE
WOMAN QUESTION.
I COULD TELL
HE WAS
SYMPATHETIC.


ON OUR SECOND
DATE WE DISCUSSED
THE MINORITY
QUESTION. HE
WAS EAGER TO
BE INFORMED.

ON OUR THIRD
DATE WE DISCUSSED
THE WALL
STREET
QUESTION.
HE WAS SLOWLY
BECOMING
ENLIGHTENED.





—LIKE WILD BILL HICKOK OR MR. DULLES.



—SHOULD BE ABOVE PARTISAN DEBATE SO AS NOT TO GIVE OUR ENEMIES THE WRONG IMPRESSION, WHATEVER THAT MAY BE.



NEXT QUESTION.

The Public Buys a Ghetto

— As Chicago "Redevelops"

FACED WITH A GROWING POPULATION, a serious housing shortage, the worst, most segregated Negro slum of any major northern metropolis, and deterioration of most housing units, Chicago is a city with a serious crisis. And yet at present it seems totally unprepared to cope with it, having no plans which even take cognizance of these major facts of its existence.

At best it moves around the fringes of the question, making grandiose plans to solve peripheral problems, frequently aggravating the major ones in the process. In this category go the many plans for highway reconstruction and improved commercial downtown facilities. And, unfortunately, the federally-aided program for urban renewal and redevelopment has fallen into this classification also.

Chicago's first experiment with urban renewal is the famous Hyde Park-Kenwood Urban Renewal Plan. This Plan has been labelled a "noble experiment," a "pioneering" attempt at "interracial living," and an "exciting precedent" for urban refurbishing. In actual fact, however, it is a tragic example of the misuse of 28 million dollars of Federal funds, which at best will help one community at the expense of the rest of the city.

Housing for the Un-Needy

At a time when the city faces a housing shortage, particularly acute for Negroes and low-income families, Hyde Park and Kenwood propose to demolish 6 thousand housing units (actually considerably more if one includes the several other unrelated projects sponsored by the University in the same area), presumably reducing the total number of available units by about one third. The housing units to be demolished are largely the residences of Negroes and low income families. The units to be built on the vacated land will rent at \$45 a room and up or sell at \$20-45,000.

No public housing is presently projected for the area (although considerable public housing is planned for the surrounding all-Negro high-density areas). Over one thousand of the families to be displaced are eligible for and desire public housing. Even the inadequate proposals originally suggested by the planners were removed at later stages of the Plan's development. A compromise 120 units has been "recommended" by the City Council after considerable public demand. Thus "victory" (assuming the recommendation is followed) for public housing amounts to less than 1 percent of the total housing projected for the area, and half of it is specified as housing for the aged.

None of the presently proposed units are specifically planned as subsidized middle-income housing. Vague "promises" have been made that after the Plan is approved the developers might possibly arrange with the Chicago Dwelling Association or co-operatives for middle-income projects; but attempts to get guarantees have been unsuccessful.

Thus the total units available are to be reduced, without provision for public or middle income housing, and without

provision that relocation be conducted in such a way as not to cause further deterioration and concentration of minorities elsewhere in the city.

Outlined in this way surely the Plan sounds nakedly anti-social. In fact, it seems at a glance hard to understand how such a proposal could be subsidized at the taxpayer's expense. Surely this Plan must have met with the outraged protest of the more enlightened and liberal sentiment in the community and the city! Surely none can ignore the fact that when the city's crucial problem is the miserable and segregated living conditions under which its 800,000 Negroes (one-fourth of the city) live, to reduce the units available to them is criminal negligence! Especially when the only other city planning in progress consists of redevelopment schemes for other areas of the city which will further reduce the units available to Negroes and low and middle-income families!

The Plan has in fact produced opposition. Opponents include the Chicago CIO which raised the demand for city-wide planning prior to any redevelopment so that those displaced would not add to the problems of the rest of the city. The Chicago Urban League in a carefully documented report noted that present urban renewal schemes will further the concentration of Negroes and the deterioration of living conditions available to them. The Chicago NAACP asked for three major changes: more public housing, middle income housing and a sounder relocation program. The community groups neighboring on Hyde Park and Kenwood warned that as presently envisioned the Plan would create insoluble problems for them, as displaced persons moved north and south into already overcrowded Woodlawn and Oakland. The local IVI (Illinois section of ADA) raised its voice in protest and a small community organization was formed expressly to oppose the plan. Strongest of all, the Catholic Archdiocese, represented by the outspoken Msgr. Egan, outlined the shortsightedness of this type of planning and urged its rejection or alteration to meet the needs of the entire city. Its Jim Crow character and its economic bias was demonstrated. In the City Council hearings, Msgr. chided the Plan's real estate proponents and the "well known businessmen, who stand to make a good profit through the Hyde Park plan," with the following insightful comments:

You do not want public housing in Hyde Park-Kenwood. You say that kind of housing will shake investor confidence, by which you mean you will not issue the pre-requisite mortgage. You say that public housing saps initiative and weakens the moral fibres of independent action which have made this country great. Now let me ask you this. When the government sells you this land at a loss to itself, when the government issues and even buys the mortgage from you so that you make your profit without risking loss, is your initiative sapped? Are our moral fibres weakened? . . . The public will grow increasingly impatient with the proposition that sound business procedures requires their dwelling in mire. Then indeed you will have a socialism which will take more than the sap of your initiative from you.

That the University of Chicago, located in Hyde Park, the major south side Chicago realtors, and out-right racists should support the plan is logical. What is more surprising is that the considerable intellectual, liberal and even semi-radical community which centers in this area appeared, particularly at first, solidly behind the Plan, and uniformly hostile to all criticism.

The "Liberals' " Logic

The most outspoken civil liberties and civil rights leaders either came out in support of the Plan or retreated in silence. The Community's religious, civic and cultural leaders all applauded enthusiastically and looked bewildered at the reaction of the NAACP, Urban League and CIO. Many of the community leaders developed a "persecution" complex, and reacted as though the opposition to the Plan was based on some devious plot by unnamed "reactionary" forces, and unfair hypocritical "utopians." All criticism was seen as "playing into the hands" of these invidious forces.

The one-mile area concerned, located near the Lake on the southside of Chicago, has during the past ten to fifteen years, become an "interracial" community—that is it has been "invaded" by the growing Negro ghetto which surrounds it. Up until 1948 it met these threats with the restrictive covenant. In 1948 this was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Since then the University of Chicago has desperately sought other means of protecting its property and institution. For as the Ghetto expands, with it expands the miserable conditions of ghetto existence. These include overcrowding, doubling and tripling-up, poor upkeep of facilities by both tenants, landlords and city officials, decreased city services, disease, juvenile delinquency, latent hostility and community apathy. These are the costs of ghetto life, of restricted choice of dwelling place by Negroes, of a shortage of housing, of the low-income status of Chicago's Negroes, of the segregated educational system existing in Chicago, of the cultural deprivation of the Negro community, and of the whole vicious cycle of conditions which aggravate and reproduce what is so well-known to and so disliked by all students of modern urbanity.

The community's "liberals" are proud that they have not fled, that they were willing to remain "and fight it out." They expect, in return, a reward.

The community's "liberals" argue that at worst this is "economic segregation," not racial segregation. They ignore the facts. In reality the two are inter-related since the average income of Chicago's Negroes is almost half that of its white population. It's a stratagem worthy of Southern racists in their attempts to find subtler means of maintaining school segregation. Besides, when has it become an accepted part of the liberal rhetoric to propose economic segregation, especially at the taxpayer's expense?

The community's "liberals" contend that Hyde Park-Kenwood is too crowded and have statistics to prove that there are other communities which can take care of the overload (are YOU in favor of overcrowding?) But true as this may be, it does not help the displaced Negro family to know that there are less-crowded lily-white communities in Chicago.

The fact that the two aldermen from Hyde Park and Kenwood favor open occupancy legislation does not take the community off the hook either. For until such legislation becomes a reality it is foolish to close one's eyes to the effect

of every decrease in housing presently available to minority groups.

The community's "liberal" argues that too much emphasis on public housing is a mistake, since public housing ("you have to face it") brings deterioration, crime, instability, and other undesirable traits. But since he still favors public housing elsewhere ("although it's not the simple answer we 'once' thought it was"), the question must be asked, wouldn't it be better to disperse public housing in communities of "high standards" rather than large, institutionalized blocks of low-income and predominantly Negro housing within the Ghetto? For unless it is dispersed in communities of precisely the Hyde Park-type it means the concentration of all the problems inherent in such projects in precisely those neighborhoods least able to cope with them.

The community's "liberal" looks askance when one criticizes the extraordinarily generous proposals for school expansion, play lots, parking lots and street widening provided for in the present Plan. Are you against school expansion, parking space, play areas, they inquire indignantly? And how hard it is to explain that one must balance between what one "desires" and what is feasible. The question actually is, unfortunately, do we want school expansion in this area at the cost of further school crowding in the Ghetto? And the question is, should the limited school budget be used to provide benefits to this area rather than others?

Community for Whom?

The community atmosphere created by those cooperating with the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, the major community spokesman for the Plan (the other major community "backer," the South East Chicago Commission, represents more clearly the University and other "moneyed" interests) has made it difficult to examine these questions calmly. As can be seen above, there are two ways to pose all the arguments. Looked at from the vantage point of a middle-upper class resident of the area who identifies with the University's interests, much can be said for the Plan. But to do so one must wear blinders as to its effects elsewhere, and on other than the middle-upper class section of the community.

The decisive argument posed by the proponents of the Plan, made in desperation and anger, is the clarion call of "community democracy." ("After all, it's something we in the community worked hard on, participated together in, and communally worked out.") The Plan is cited, time and again, as a model of democratic planning. "We" were "in" on it from the beginning, we are told, making "our" needs, desires and wishes known at every stage of the development. Granted; although at least one-third of "us" (how rarely that third is thought of as being part of the community however) didn't exactly get what we wanted, but instead got booted out of the community altogether. But still, democracy cannot satisfy everyone. We must all compromise a little.

Lest we be accused of too much scoffing, let us admit readily that the Plan was remarkable in terms of the extent of participation which did exist. But still more remarkable was the illusion of participation. A vast network of participating groups were created, only a small part spontaneously. This network consisted of block groups, Conference meetings, meetings of every major community organization, detailed discussions in the community newspaper, a long, exhaustive

Community hearing before the City-appointed Conservation Community Council at which over a hundred individuals presented suggestions, criticisms, ideas. In other words everyone had his say. Of course, all this is weighted to begin with in view of the disorganization, lack of articulation and absence of identification with the community that exists among the newly arrived, transient, low-income Negro and white resident.

But just how meaningful were all these "democratic" processes? And does the word "democracy" really describe the processes in any case? Yes, if democracy means the right to be heard. No, if it means that the wishes expressed by the community have an effect upon the actual design and policy of the Plan.

Increasing the Ghetto

For despite the fact that the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference, the block groups and most of the varied religious, cultural and social organizations who testified before the Conservation Community Council favored more public housing, this same Council then reduced the already inadequate proposal to zero. Despite overwhelming support for the addition of specifically-designated middle-income housing, the Council made no such recommendations. Despite the fact that most of the organizations testifying urged that guarantees be written into the plan specifying that displaced persons would not be relocated into crowded Ghetto communities, the Council made no recommendations along these lines! (In fact, so democratic were the procedures that it was only months afterwards during cross examination before the City Council that it "leaked" out that the Conservation Community Council had been divided on public housing and that a minority report had been presented urging the maintenance of some public housing.)

In other words, the final plan presented to the Federal government and to the City Council for approval bore no signs of having been affected by these criticisms and suggestions, except for uncontroversial minutiae.

After Federal approval the Plan went into its final stage—City Council approval. A renewed sense of crisis crept over the community. The local "liberal community," speaking through the Hyde Park-Kenwood Conference, urged immediate adoption without changes. The changes they insisted upon originally they now hardly referred to, suggesting that after all some of them could still be worked for after Council adoption (by pleading with the same agencies that hitherto had turned a deaf ear to them). Delay would be terrible, they cried. We must now accept the plan even in its unsatisfactory state or we may have no plan at all! ("realpolitik").

Yet the fact is that the Conference played a strange game in which it carefully backtracked away from displaying its power to alter the Plan. For there is no doubt that without their support the Plan could not be passed, could not in fact have gotten Federal approval at all. Then why, with such power in their hands, did they have to settle for a Plan which did not meet their most vital objections? Why did they retreat from pressing their point at every opportunity? Why, when they had that opportunity so rare for the liberal and academic-minded types to determine social policy, did they capitulate? The University and the realtors were desperate for some plan. They would have accepted whatever was attainable rather than have nothing at all. Far more than the individual resi-

dents, the University could not risk having nothing at all. Yet in the end the University made no compromises, and the community and its residents made all of them.

The University's dilemma is understandable. They have a large institution whose survival is at stake. With community deterioration will come parental fears, fewer student applications and decreased faculty appeal. From their standpoint they want as "safe" a community as they can get: safe from every angle. The less it runs counter to the potential biases of potential students, parents or faculty the "safer" it is. Every unit of public housing means that much greater likelihood of a problem family, that much greater likelihood of a Negro resident, that much greater possibility that some respectable white citizen will decide not to move into the neighborhood, or not to send his son or daughter to the University of Chicago. Every decreased housing unit available to non-whites means one less "risk." In other words, as long as they could "get away with it," The University saw no reason to champion proposals for housing that stood any chance of creating social problems, parental suspicions, financial risks.

Through a variety of means they were able to atomize the more critical forces in the community until late in the Plan's progress. They were able to create a swamp of confusion into which the very best minds in the community wandered aimlessly. They were aided by several weaknesses which intellectuals, liberals and the contemporary enlightened citizen are victims of. They played upon the well-known infatuation which the liberal and social scientist is prone to—adoration for planning, neat architectural plans, handsome model communities, etc. Issue after issue of the *Hyde Park Herald* was filled with maps, designs and pictures of the "community of tomorrow" filled with trees, shrubs, glassy houses, wide streets and lovely plazas. They could count also upon the recently respectable tendency of self-proclaimed liberals to boast about their self-centeredness and their selfishness.

The ultimate excuse of the Plan's proponents was that, after all, even if the Plan will not aid in solving the real housing problem facing Chicago, isn't it too much to expect that "we" Hyde Parkers be martyrs for the sake of the rest of the City. "We's done 'our share.'"

And therein lies the real tragedy. For while the city's crisis deepens, those who should be leaders in the struggle to change the pattern, have been devoting their time, energy and reputations to a plan which cannot conceivably be a pattern, a bold experiment or a pioneering project aimed at the solution to that crisis. At best it will slightly hinder the eventual solution; at worst it will set a precedent not for the breaking down of the ghetto or the increasing of our housing supply but for a rash of urban renewal projects whose effect will be the intensifying of all those problems which today beset Chicago.

DEBBIE MEIER

Debbie Meier is an active member of the Chicago NAACP.

REMEMBER THE YOUTH MARCH
STAND UP FOR CIVIL RIGHTS!

The American Century

— The Relevance of Capitalism

"The world cannot be run as a company town—at least not if we want it to be a democratic world."

GUNNAR MYRDAL

IT WAS NOT TOO LONG AGO that the American Century was proclaimed. We were told, particularly by Henry Luce's magazines, that this country was entering upon a period of benevolent domination of the world. But the American Century was short-lived. If we date its birth in the offices of Time, Incorporated, at some point around 1940, then we must locate its demise in the past decade, for during this period the rise of Communist power has made any American claim to global hegemony an idle boast. In short, the Century lasted less than two decades.

Yet our present situation perplexes most Americans. Haven't we given millions, even billions, of dollars in foreign aid? Do we have any colonies? Why is it that we are so genuinely distrusted throughout the area of the Colonial Revolution when this country has so often stood up for the ideal of political freedom?

Liberal Cult of Personality

Some of those who are disturbed have found an easy answer to their own questions: John Foster Dulles. They have siezed upon the undeniable talent of the greatest Secretary of State since Dean Acheson to carry out policy with tactlessness and stupidity. And yet, this answer is much too arbitrary, for it locates the massive direction of American policy in the will of a single man. The problem, as we shall see, goes much deeper than that. Indeed, one cannot approach it sensibly without invoking a conception which is quite out of style in genteel political and academic circles these days: capitalism.

For American foreign policy, whatever its intentions (and often, as in the case of some of those who favored the Marshall Plan and Point Four, the intentions were humanitarian) is a capitalist policy. This is not to say that this country usually acts in the old "gunboat-up-the-Yangtze" manner of British imperialism in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Rather, it is to argue that the fact that decision making in American society is *dominated by the interest of a minority, of the businessmen*, has basic, tragic impact upon this country's attempt to relate to a world in furious transition.

First, let us define the problem which we face.

According to Barbara Ward, the British economist, the "Atlantic nations"—the advanced capitalist countries led by the United States—account for 16 per cent of the world's population and consume 70 per cent of the world's income. This enormous fact is one of the decisive, defining factors of world politics in our time.

For the "other" 84 per cent of the planet is in social motion. In part, there is the one third of the world which is attempting to destroy this inequality through the process of totalitarian accumulation: the Communist bloc. In these countries, a pitiless bureaucracy extracts a surplus from the workers and peasants and uses it to modernize the nation.

The benefits of this modernization, needless to say, are hardly uniform. The bureaucracy tastes the joys of twentieth century existence at once; the great mass of the people remain exploited, terrorized and at low levels of life.

And the other one third? That is a crucial area of international politics. Indeed, one can say that the fate of the twentieth century, of democracy and freedom, depends upon what happens to these nations which have only recently won their independence from colonial domination. If they take the road of totalitarian accumulation, of Communism, the millions will be condemned to a harsh, brutal existence, and the threat of war will continue. If they are won for democracy—which is to say, if democracy becomes a viable force within these countries—the result will not be confined to a decent and humane life for the people within the nation. It will also mean a powerful inducement for change within the Communist orbit, the appearance of a real alternative; and a general decrease in the danger of atomic holocaust.

For half a century, however, the lot of these hundreds of millions has been getting worse. Socially and economically, the standard of living of the colonial masses has been in decline. There has been a population explosion in the areas in which productivity has been rising slowly, or not at all, and it is the minority of rich nations which have been getting an ever larger share of the goods of this world. Thus, as Gunnar Myrdal describes it in his *An International Economy*, there has been the historical development of wealth increasingly concentrated among the few and misery more and more spread out among the many.

Breaking the Circle

If the under-developed areas are to break this vicious circle, if they are to go upward, they must accumulate. This can be done internally through totalitarian measures, through a denial of all human freedom, as in Russia and China. It *Could* be done through a massive program of aid from the advanced nations. But as it stands today, the brunt of American policy under *Acheson and Dulles* has been to reinforce this tendency toward increasing misery. In such a situation, it is understandable that Communism is able to recruit volunteers to its banner in countries like China and Indo-China while the "Free World" must rely on dictators and despots. More than this, such a state of affairs guarantees the conditions which make war a possibility at every moment: instability, violent hatreds, the movement of frustrated masses, the appearance of demagogic leaders who cannot satisfy material needs and who are thus pushed in the direction of military adventures.

The *fact*, then, is that the world has become a more miserable place for the hundreds of millions precisely at that point in human history when the advances of technology make abundance for all possible. The *fact* is that America's fundamental foreign policy, its Marshall Plan, Point Four, NATO and all the rest, has not succeeded in materially changing this

disastrous drift of world affairs. And the reason behind the fact, the cause of this situation, is the social system which we hardly discuss any more: capitalism.

This is how a United Nations study, quoted by Myrdal, put it: "... the under-developed countries helped to maintain, in the prices which they paid for their imported manufactures relative to those which they obtained for their own primary products, a rising standard of living in the industrialized countries, without receiving, in the price of their own products, a corresponding equivalent contribution toward their own standards of living." We might translate this into more simple language. Throughout all the American speeches about the "war against poverty" and the anti-colonialist basis of American foreign policy, the reality of the capitalist part of the world has been to have the Indian peasant pay for prosperity in the United States.

Capitalism As a System

This is not to imply a canard of vicious businessmen who glory in the misery of the colonial masses and who consciously manipulate that suffering for profit. Exactly the opposite. It is the impact of capitalism in the world *as a system*, and no matter how charitable the capitalist may be or how inspiring the Point Four speeches, which has this result. There are many aspects to this phenomenon and space permits the mention of only a few. When Western capital flows into under-developed nations, it goes, not toward creating an integrated and balanced economy, but for the enlargement of export industries; under-developed countries must often compete with advanced nations where the superiority of technology is a decisive edge; monopolistic controls are generally effective in advanced nations and ineffective in the under-developed economy; and so on.

Take a specific case. In December, 1952, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a resolution calling for the "financing of economic development through the establishment of fair and equitable international prices for primary commodities." The motivation behind this step involved the squeeze on the international market whereby the under-developed nations were getting less for what they exported and paying more for what they imported. It also touched upon the fact that these under-developed countries desperately need international price stability because they cannot plan their own growth if there are to be wild fluctuations in the capital that is available to them. In other words, what the UN was voting on was a mild plea for economic rationality on the world scene.

The motion passed—on the votes of the under-developed nations. The industrially advanced nations, the capitalist nations, voted against. In doing so, they were acting upon their narrow self-interest, for it is to the glory of profit that the present situation continue. But they were, of course, also condemning the world to more misery and to the danger of war. Not that a UN Resolution would have revolutionized the situation. But is precisely here that the point becomes even more compelling. World capitalism was unwilling to vote even for the *rhetoric* of decency in international economic relations.

The United States plays the role of pre-eminent capitalist power in this situation. And, according to Myrdal, if we take all of American aid to under-developed nations and put it

on one side of a scale; and place American exploitation of these same economies through its international economic operations on the other, then the latter is the more powerful force. That is to say that we have *depressed* the economies of the countries of the colonial revolution through our capitalist system more than we have helped them through our much heralded aid. And to top this off, America, which has surrounded its wealth with all kinds of protectionist restrictions, has advocated that the under-developed nations abolish their controls! According to this logic, it is advanced industry which needs help—and backward industry which should bravely compete on a basis of "equality."

The South Americans know this well. During World War II, the United States paid for imports from that part of the world at prevailing prices but did not, because of the war, make goods immediately available. After the war when the South Americans were able to collect on what they had sold in terms of goods, our inflation simply destroyed their profit. In this situation, as in so many others, the poorer nations paid for the profits of the rich. Such examples could be multiplied almost endlessly, but the basic point should by now be clear: that the workings of the capitalist system on a world scale is hostile to the human welfare of the millions and calculated to suit the advantage of the very few.

Indeed, Gunnar Myrdal, who believes that the Marxist view of class struggle is totally inapplicable for the advanced nations, also feels that the Marxist prediction of increasing misery for the masses probably holds on the international scene. It is in this spirit that the Swedish economist speaks of the "international class war."

America's Foreign Aid

And yet, one can hear objection to all of this: isn't it true that America has attempted to modify the impact of its economic dominance through unselfishly granting massive aid to under-developed countries? Here again the key concept remains that of capitalism. For, as we shall see, American aid has been characterized by tragic inadequacy and even canceled out by American economic policy.

First of all, let us examine the character of the aid. When it was a question of reconstructing European *capitalism* after World War II, the United States was relatively generous. For if this country seeks dominance over all other capitalist powers, it also understands that it must maintain capitalism as a world system. That was the impact of the Marshall Plan (and again, this is not to gainsay the genuine idealism of many who supported this move). Thus, from the end of World War II to 1953, well over two thirds of American aid, \$23.4 billion, went to Europe. When it came to the nations of the colonial revolution in this same period, there was \$7.6 billion. But even this figure is deceptive. For \$2.3 billion was direct military aid, and \$4.9 billion went to Formosa (Chiang), South Korea (Rhee), Japan and the Philippines. For the rest of the colonial revolution, that is for the majority of the world's people outside of the Communist bloc, there was half a billion dollars!

This distribution of American aid is not accidental. In the first place, as already noted, the preference is for the reconstruction of advanced capitalist powers. When it does get to be a matter of the colonial revolution, the bulk goes to "safe" despots like Chiang and Rhee, to the most advanced

capitalist power of the area, Japan, and to America's old dependency, the Philippines. Nations like Burma and India which were seeking a democratic road to modernization got the crumbs. Indeed, on one occasion America mobilized support against a UN proposition which asserted that the natural resources of every nation belonged to that nation. The reason given was that such a statement might become a justification for nationalizing foreign property!

In addition to the way in which American aid is distributed, we must also take the countervailing impact of capitalist policy into account. Barbara Ward has estimated that the recession resulted, during 1957, in a 13 per cent fall in the general price of raw materials. The loss of income to the primary producers of the under-developed nations in this situation was about 3 billion dollars—or *three* times the amount of aid given to all of the under-developed countries over the same time span. The capitalist right hand giveth; the capitalist left hand taketh away. In the same kind of way, Mrs. Ward describes the relation between the United States and India in the recent past. India is now in the midst of a five year plan which, if it succeeds (and this is certainly quite questionable) will keep the level of misery in that country more or less stable. This is the normal problem of running fast to stand still which so often plagues those nations with exploding population figures.

Before 1956, Mrs. Ward writes, India was moving along its determined course. But in that year, income from major exports like tea, jute and manganese fell heavily. Efforts to increase textile exports met quotas and restrictions on the part of the advanced capitalist nations. And when Western capitalist goods producers began to feel the pinch of the recession, they simply began to deliver their machines to India ahead of schedule. As income fell, costs rose. The upshot of all this is that India faces the total collapse of its program unless some \$350 million can be raised by March.

An even more striking case in point was there for everybody to see this summer during the Middle Eastern crisis. On behalf of the United States, Eisenhower magnanimously offered to provide \$100 million for the development of the region. On the face of it, this sounds like a proposal of some considerable benevolence. But place it in context and then look at it. During 1957, American and British oil profits from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were *several times* the amount of aid pledged by the American government. We took out of the Middle East perhaps a billion in profits; and we charitably proposed to deal with the situation by granting a hundred million in aid!

We can summarize this development in a series of propositions which are hardly ever mentioned in the United States today. First, the misery of the overwhelming bulk of the world's population is increasing, and has been doing so for fifty years. Second, the wealth of the few has been on the rise, and this because the world capitalist market automatically guarantees an advantage to the advanced nations. Third, the protectionist and tariff policies, particularly of the United States, have further intensified the immiseration of the people of the "uncommitted third" of the world. Fourth, American aid programs have been meagre, capitalist oriented, and even when they bring money into under-developed nations, their impact is offset by the depressing effect of American corporate and government activity. In short, despite all of the fine rhet-

oric about the County Agents of the Point Four Program, America is the enemy of the revolutionary masses of the world in the very real sense that it keeps their standards of living down in order to maximize profit. And the basic dynamic of this whole process is an American society in which decision is based upon the aim of a tiny minority which seeks to increase its profit even if the international consequence of this is to increase misery and the danger of a Third World War.

These are the factors which lie underneath the political gyrations of Acheson and Dulles. They are constant, undisturbed even by the articulate and conscious stupidity of the present Secretary of State. And they are part of a larger whole: the inability of capitalism to come to grips with the world in revolution which it faces. If these are a few examples of how this American system works in its economic impact, we could cite even more cases of political reaction which are of the same piece. The overthrow of a Government in Guatemala, the "mediation" of the Iranian dispute so as to depose the Premiere and to take oil rights away from our British friends, the suicidal line of backing the playboy Emperor Bao Dai in Indo China, these and many other instances are reflections of the same process which we have been discussing mainly in economic terms.

The world is sick of capitalism and, as we have seen, for good reason. The revolutionary masses of the colonial revolution, the workers of Europe, cannot view America as the image of *their* future. Communism, on the other hand, appeals to millions precisely because it is anti-capitalist as an alternative. That Communism means introducing a new form of exploitation and inhumanity for the old capitalist modes is a bitter truth that many of these people learn only too late, after Communism has triumphed. For in Communism's march to power in a country like China, the people are not half so much conscious of the facts which they have read or heard about totalitarianism in Russia as they are about the facts which they know in their day to day life about Chiang and his American backers. Their course is tragic—and, given the continuation of American policy as it is now constituted, their course will be followed by hundreds of millions.

This is to suggest that we need a basic re-thinking and restructuring of American foreign policy. Yet here, as in every other area of American political life, we encounter a conspiracy of silence about basic issues. In the main, this is a product of our present party system which yokes those forces which might begin to develop a decent approach, above all the labor movement which does not have a stake in capitalism like those business interests which dominate our society, and keeps them in bondage to the status quo. If we are to be realists, we must say that the present tragedy of America in the world will go on so long as capitalist self-interest remains the dynamic of our policy; and capitalist self interest will go unchallenged as long as most progressive forces in the nation refrain from speaking in their own name and with their own program out of subservience to the value of being "realistic."

Capitalism, that ungentle word, that Banquo's ghost of The American Century, remains the central problem of our nation and of our time.

CHRISTOPHER MARKS

Christopher Marks discussed Franklin Roosevelt in a previous issue of ANVIL.

Equality in America

— The Statistical Illusion

The demand for equality is the root of social conscience and the sense of duty. FREUD

WHILE OPINIONS ON THE SUBJECT VARY, many people feel that the most objectionable feature of capitalism is its unequal distribution of the fruits of production. Thus we find that bourgeois economists have, for generations, made successive, but unsuccessful, efforts to justify that inequality. They have claimed inequality promotes economic progress, or reflects inequality of productiveness, or is necessary for "culture."

But these apologetics were never very convincing; even the apologists were not convinced, for now they are most pleased to announce that economic inequality has been reduced in modern America, that capitalism is reforming itself. In the words of Arthur F. Burns, formerly Eisenhower's chief economic adviser:

The transformation in the distribution of our national income that has occurred within the past twenty years . . . may already be counted as one of the great social revolutions in history.¹

Has this transformation actually occurred? Let us take a look at the statistics which underly Mr. Burns' broad assertion.

The Statistical Illusion

There are two main statistical methods used to support the proposition that economic inequality is less than it used to be. The first method is a comparison of the share in the national income received in 1929 by some top layer of society—usually the top 5% of the population—with the proportion received by it during the postwar period. To get the incomes of the top 5%, data from income tax returns are used. The second method is a comparison of the share of national income going to "labor" (actually, total wages and salaries) in 1929 with the share in the postwar period. As we shall see, both of these methods are misleading.

As exemplified by the monumental study of Simon Kuznets, the first method has the striking result that the top 5% of the population, which took 26% of the total (before-tax) income in 1929, had its share reduced to (a mere!) 18% by 1946.² A thorough refutation of this result would require a statistical apparatus too formidable for the pages of ANVIL.³ However, the general line of such a refutation will be indicated so that the non-economist may know generally where this argument is vulnerable, and will not be awed by the authority of professors and number-mongers.

Our first criticism is that the income data for the top 5% do not include their share of corporate profits not paid out as dividends. Since the proportion of corporate profits paid out as dividends has greatly declined in the past twenty years, and since dividends are mainly paid to the rich, it is evident that the decline in income share of the top 5% is greatly overstated by omitting these undistributed profits from the calculation.

One economist recomputed Kuznets' results by including all corporate profits instead of just dividends paid; his result was that instead of the share of the top 5% declining from

26% in 1929 to 18% in 1946, it fell from 29% to 24%—a substantial reduction in the amount of redistribution.⁴

The second criticism is based on the fact that the files of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, from which the basic data are culled, contain the largest collection of lies in the history of mankind. To state the point more sedately, property incomes are systematically understated both legally and illegally, in income tax returns.

There is plain old-fashioned cheating—of taxable income simply never reported on tax returns. This is especially true of property incomes which are very difficult to trace. At the same time almost all wage incomes are subject to withholding tax and cannot be concealed. According to two separate estimates for 1952, comparing income reported on tax returns with national income, wages and salaries were underreported by only 4-5%, dividends by 13-15%, unincorporated business profits by 28-30%, and interest by 61-64%. One author, speaking of the underreporting of dividends, commented dryly,

It is hard to resist the conclusion that the zeal with which people reported their dividend income declined sharply between 1939 and 1952.⁶

There is also a huge amount of more or less legal tax evasion; a fact which is not merely acknowledged, but is advertised and encouraged by leading business magazines. I will mention briefly some of the better known methods of taking one's income so that it doesn't have to be reported on the income tax return (and incidentally fails to appear in income distribution statistics).⁷

Legalized Cheating

1) The expense account now provides for a large portion of the entertainment, travel, and eating expenses of top corporate officials. Most of the best nightclubs, theatres, restaurants and travel agencies would have to close down in a week if the expense account were to become a taxable item.*

2) Another way of making life lusher for the corporate elite is through the granting of stock options. These entitle the holder to buy from the company a certain amount of stock usually at prices well below the market price. Thus they are as good as money in the bank, but are not taxable as income and do not show up in income distribution statistics.

3) The law especially provides excessive depreciation, exploration and depletion allowances to many businesses. It has been reliably estimated that these items alone resulted in a reduction in taxable business profits amounting to \$7.4 billion.⁸

4) Finally, we note the capital gains dodge. Capital gains are the profits from the sale of such property as stocks and real estate whose market price has risen. Capital gains are taxed at a low rate, and therefore those in the high tax bracket

* It is also hard to down the suspicion that many a callgirl has an incorporated pander.

ets try to convert what would otherwise be profits into capital gains:

Many tax lawyers spend their time quite profitably devising complex corporate rearrangements to do this very thing.⁹

But the income distribution data do not take these gains into account, and thus understate the income of those in the highest income brackets.

In fact, I submit that the greater equality in income distribution is largely a statistical illusion, and that the illusion stems from the impact of sudden steep rises in tax rates on the amounts of income reported by people in high tax brackets. In the postwar period the tax rates have stayed at this high level, and so has the tax evasion.¹⁰ Furthermore, as one writer pointed out:

The amount of understatement [of inequality] has probably been increasing in recent years as taxpayers become more expert at designing new methods of avoiding the impact of the high tax rates and as Congress continues to enact new relief provisions for the same purpose. This means that the apparent stability in the relative distribution of income since 1944 may conceal a gradual but persistent increase in inequality¹¹ (emphasis added).

The questioning reader may object at this point that this concerns *before tax* income. What about the effect of progressive taxes on the income distribution?

It is easy to be misled by the apparent progressivity of the tax structure. The surtax rates on incomes are very high, but the *average* rates are quite modest. The top 5% paid an average tax of less than 20% of their *reported* income in 1956. Their share of before-tax income was 20%, while their share of after-tax income was only reduced to 18%.¹² Furthermore, this result only is relevant to the income tax, the most progressive part of the tax structure; what about the rest of the taxes that are paid? Data provided by a recent study show that aside from Federal income taxes, the rest of the tax system is the opposite of progressive. The top income group (over \$10,000) received 25% of the income but only paid 19% of the taxes. Even including the income tax, this group's share of after-tax income was only 2.3% lower than its share of before tax income. And most of this redistribution was in favor of the middle income groups.

The second commonly used method of describing changes in income distribution is to examine changes in the ratio of wages and salaries to total personal income over time. (Personal income is the total money income received by individuals from any source; undistributed corporate profits are excluded, as are capital gains.) If we were to accept this as a correct method, then the figures show a startling improvement in the relative position of labor. In 1929, the share of personal income going to labor was 59%; by 1946-57 it had risen to 67%. However, this supposed improvement is also, as we shall see, quite illusory.

Let us note first that these computations ignore the factor of undistributed corporate profits. Since 1929, total corporate profits have tripled, while dividends have risen only 50%. If we include *all* corporate profits—as most writers on the subject are agreed we should—as part of property income, then the supposed gain on the part of labor is reduced by 40%—instead of the 59-67%, labor's share rises only from 56 to 61%.

Now what is the significance of this result in terms of the distribution of income? If we take the types of income (wages and salaries, rent, interest, etc.) received by the top 5% and

the way in which those different types have changed over time, a relatively simple computation shows that a shift between property and other types of income would have resulted in only a small reduction in the share of the top 5% from 32.0% to 30.5%. The reason is that in 1929 the top 5% to 44% of their incomes in the form of wages and salaries. Thus a rise in wages and salaries does not necessarily mean that the rich are becoming relatively poorer; rather it is a question of *whose* wages and salaries?

We should also take note that if wages and salaries are taken as a proportion of total income in some given sector of the economy, we may get a different result. For example, labor's share of the total income originating in the corporate sector of the economy rose only 2%—from 74.6% in 1929 to 76.7% in 1946-55.¹³ Labor's share of income originating in manufacturing actually shows a decline from 74.2% in 1929 to 72.6% in 1946-55.²¹ It is evident that if there has been any improvement in labor's position, it has not been relative to that of capital.

At this point, a final caveat should be entered. Even if we were to accept, in their entirety, the claims that economic inequality has been substantially reduced since 1929, we should still have to take cognizance of the fact that the amount of inequality which still exists is very great. The top 5% still account for at least 20% of total personal income.¹⁵ Furthermore, they own at *least half* of the non-farm income producing property (including all houses) in the country.¹⁶ This is *after* that "revolution" in the "New America."

But there is no "new America"; only the advertising business is better—there being more of it. HERMAN ROSEMAN
Herman Roseman is a young American economist.

FOOTNOTES

¹ Arthur Burns, *Looking Forward*, 31st annual report of the National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951.

² Simon Kuznets, *Shares of Upper Income Groups in Income and Savings*, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1953, p. 585.

³ For more thorough critiques, see Victor Perlo, *The Income 'Revolution'*, International Publishers, 1954, and Gabriel Kolko, "America's Income 'Revolution,'" *Dissent*, Winter, 1957.

⁴ Alan M. Cartter, "Income Shares of Upper Income Groups in Great Britain and the United States," *American Economic Review*, December, 1954.

⁵ Daniel M. Holland and C. Harry Kahn, "Comparison of Personal and Taxable Income," *Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability*, Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 1955.

⁶ Daniel M. Holland, "Dividend Underreporting on Tax Returns," *Journal of Finance*, May, 1958.

⁷ For a brief but thorough discussion of the following section, see Joseph A. Pechman, "Comment," (on Selma Goldsmith's paper) in *An Appraisal of the 1950 Census Income Data*, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1958, pp. 107-115.

⁸ William F. Hellmuth, Jr., "Erosion of Federal Corporation Income Tax Base," *Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Stability*, p. 914.

⁹ Pechman, *op. cit.*, p. 119.

¹⁰ For a quick view of how tax rates jumped during the war, see the *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1957*, U. S. Bureau of the Census, 1957.

¹¹ Pechman, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

¹² *Survey of Current Business*, April, 1958.

¹³ *Productivity, Prices, and Income*, Materials prepared for the Joint Committee on the Economic Report, 1957, p. 98.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

¹⁵ *Survey of Current Business*, April, 1958.

¹⁶ Kuznets, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

A Parable for the Destroyers

— *Bridge on the River Kwai*

FACED WITH A DECLINING MARKET, and threatened with extinction by the TV Western, Hollywood has gone middle-brow. Bowdlerizing a reckless course from Dostoevsky to Faulkner, from O'Neill to Mailer, the film moguls have arranged for a series of literary transfusions to beef up a sick industry. The latest victim is Pierre Boule, a serious novelist whose *Bridge on the River Kwai* has been parlayed into a box-office triumph and widely proclaimed as THE serious art film of 1958. Seven Academy Awards, a hit tune, and a radio commercial later, it is time for a sober appraisal.

The Bridge on the River Kwai is a magnificent fraud. Greeted by many as an anti-war film, it is in fact a celebration of the military virtues. Hollywood script-writers have borrowed from Herman Wouk the device of calculated ambiguity which permits an audience to experience simultaneously the fleeting joys of rebellion and the deeper satisfactions of conformity. In this case, the audience can participate both in an apparent condemnation of the military code and in its ultimate vindication. The viewer can drain off his secret hostility to the military mind, but the catharsis is rendered socially harmless because it leaves the solid core of military values intact.

Yet the film is magnificent: a fraud but potentially great. The source of its potential lies in the allegorical meanings to which we are led by the device of a parallel plot.

The Contrasting Narrative

Structurally the film consists of two narrative strands: the story of Colonel Nicholson (Alec Guinness) and the story of Commander Shears (William Holden). Both stories begin in a Japanese prisoner-of-war camp in Burma. They go their separate but parallel ways when Shears attempts to escape, and are reunited when Shears returns with a demolition team to blow up the bridge which Nicholson has constructed for the Japanese. Both stories divide neatly in half; the break occurs at the point when Nicholson defeats Colonel Saito (Sessue Hayakawa) by a campaign of passive resistance, and when Shears makes good his escape to the coast. We may therefore divide the film for convenience into Parts I and II.

The theme of Part I is survival. This theme is emphasized by the opening shot: the jungle, the circling vulture, the graves by the railroad track, the half-starved and bedraggled prisoners. The problem initially is to survive: to survive against odds, against the cruelties of nature and the brutalities of man, against sun, beri beri, snakebite, gangrene, overwork, Saito. Survival in the camp (Nicholson) vs. survival in the jungle (Shears).

The odds against escape, we are told, are 100 to 1. But the odds against survival in a Japanese labor battalion are not much better. Nicholson counts on rigid adherence to the military code as laid down in the Geneva Convention to see him through. Shears, who is impersonating a naval officer in the hope of enjoying better treatment as a prisoner-of-war, relies precisely on the violation of that code, on flagrantly unmilitary conduct and personal opportunism. Paradoxically,

through a combination of luck and individual courage, each wins through.

But after survival, what? Then man's creative potential is released. This is the theme of Part II: man as creator and destroyer of his own world. It is embodied in Nicholson's heroic, if misguided, efforts to build the bridge, and Major Warden's (Jack Hawkins) equally heroic determination to destroy it. That both men are fanatics—quite mad—is one of the major points of the film. Heroic effort is no longer enough to ensure human survival; it is now necessary that we direct that effort to creative human ends.

Creation and Destruction

The film develops a tension, then, between man's capacity to create and to destroy. The destructive impulses are easier to handle, and I shall deal with them first. They are given dramatic expression in the British commando school, where Major Warden trains experts in death and demolition. As Shears approaches the school, Warden is just concluding a lecture (Boom!). He has been demonstrating a new plastic explosive to his students. Later, Shears is given an "L" pill—"L" for lethal—in case he is captured by the enemy. In short, the commando school represents all of the resources of modern science and technology mobilized in the service of death.

Notice what happens to Shears as he walks toward commando headquarters: he is jumped by young Joyce, who is practicing "knife drill." This is symbolic of his actual relations with Warden, who also takes him by surprise in a more serious way. Revealing his knowledge of Shears' impersonation, he forces him to "volunteer" for the demolition team. Beneath the polite exterior is the veiled threat, the organized state power. Shears is shanghaied, or if you prefer, *drafted* ("I'm a civilian at heart") for the mission.

In the meantime Colonel Nicholson, having won his point of honor that officers are not to perform manual labor, assumes command of the work on the bridge. The Japanese are building a railroad from Bangkok to Rangoon, and Saito has a deadline to meet. He therefore defers to the superior technical and organizational skills of the British, vowing however to commit suicide when the bridge is completed, because he has been outfaced.

Nicholson restores discipline ("Thanks to the Japanese, we now command a rabble") and forbids sabotage ("It's not military behavior"). Throughout this sequence, the film stresses the relationship between military and industrial discipline: "We'll teach them Western methods of efficiency that will put them to shame." These methods consist of a more rational division of labor, time study, increased work quotas, and the introduction of a "healthy competitive spirit" between the British and Japanese troops. They include also a peculiar show of ruthlessness: Saito, in his cruelest mood, threatens to use hospital patients on the bridge; in a crisis, Nicholson actually uses them. That pathetic line of cripples, marching off to do their bit, in all its heroism and human

degradation, is surely some sort of ultimate symbol of Western civilization.

It remains for Dr. Clipton (James Donald) to challenge Nicholson's values. Acting as Greek chorus throughout the film, he asks if building the bridge is a good idea, if it might not be construed as collaboration with the enemy, even treason. The shocked Nicholson asks in turn whether the Doctor, if Saito were ill, would refuse to operate on him. One day, he argues, the war will be over, and people who use the bridge will remember who built it.

The Colonel's creative impulses cannot be gainsaid. He is thrilled by the prospect that a well-built bridge might last for six-hundred years. The point is this: his desire to create is *perverted* by the context in which it occurs: war. For whatever its permanent value, the bridge is part of a Japanese military operation.

Let me pursue the theme of perversion for a bit. Look at the careers of some of the principal characters. Saito spent three years at the London Polytechnic. He had wanted to be an artist, but his father forced him to become an engineer. Warden, before the war, taught oriental languages at Cambridge. He now employs his teaching and linguistic skills in the service of destruction. Joyce, in civilian life, has been a bank clerk, adding up meaningless columns of figures. He has volunteered for commando work because the regular army offered no scope for initiative or intelligence. It is a picture of universal frustration, of thwarted creative energy seeking destructive outlets.

Life Means: "Blast"

Nicholson sums it up as he and Saito stand on the bridge, admiring their beautiful creation. He's spent twenty-eight years in the army, he confides, and only ten months at home. It was a good life, he insists, but "sometimes you ask yourself what the sum total of your life represents, particularly in comparison with other men's careers." Just at that point he drops his swagger stick into the stream below. "Blast!" he exclaims, which is just what happens to the bridge, the crowning achievement of his army career.

The sexual level of the film supports this interpretation, with the perversion of creative powers being dramatized through a homosexual motif. There is a magnificent scene in which the British soldiers are celebrating the completion of the bridge. They have worked up a "girlie" show, in which a group of soldiers appear dressed as women. The backdrop behind the stage consists of a model of the bridge, with a series of fire-pots burning near the foundations: the creation-destruction theme rendered visible. The point is that their beautiful creation is in fact as sterile as their entertainment.

A "couple" comes on stage and sings lovingly the old sentimental favorite:

If you were the only girl in the world
And I were the only boy,
Nothing else would matter in the world today,
We would go on living in the same old way,
A garden of Eden just for two
With nothing to mar our joy.

These men have not been able to go on living in the same old way, because of the war. The sexual sterility of war is emphasized by the suffering which one senses behind their hilarity.

There is a garden of Eden in the film, but the war has marred its joy. Warden's demolition team has forced its way through the jungle with the help of girl-bearers from a native village. In an idyllic scene they stop to bathe in a lovely mountain stream. They are surprised by a Japanese patrol, and within seconds the stream turns crimson with the blood of the dead Japanese.

War prevents sexual fulfillment: that is the point of the strange relationship between the demolition team and the native girls. There are coy smiles, tender looks, but no kisses. The sexual product of war is in fact Onanism. Saito's knife, Nicholson's swagger stick, Warden's mortar—all are turned inward in an orgy of self-destruction. And so with the bridge, which is only so much seed spilled on the ground.

A Contemporary Parable

We have, then, in *The Bridge on the River Kwai*, a parable for our time. The primary phase of human history is a brute struggle with nature. This phase is captured vividly by the photography of the film. The characters are locked in mortal combat with the jungle, with the mountains, with the river, with the sea. Then the film proceeds to encompass the major stages of human society: tribal (Burmese native village), feudal (Japanese) and capitalist (British). As the level of technology rises, the possibility of triumph over the wilderness increases. But the victory over nature symbolized by the bridge is threatened by the perversion of technology to military ends. This is the central drama of our epoch.

So what's wrong? Why is the film a failure? That it degenerates in the final sequence into a dime-a-dozen suspense film full of crude melodrama might be overlooked. But the false and shoddy denouement forces a reversal of the meanings implicit in the rest of the film. During the final extravaganza we are forced to relinquish the moral insights to which a different ending might have driven us, in favor of a wild flurry of conventional emotions. Such are the working of Woukian ambiguity.

On one level, the film tries to transcend the narrow conventions of the military code. The most dramatic example is the scene in the jungle where Shears refuses to abandon Warden, who cannot walk any farther on his injured foot. Warden orders him to proceed ("The objective comes first in our work"), but Shears refuses to obey. Instead he delivers himself of a speech which might be called the rhetorical center of the film:

There's the stench of death about you, in your pack, like the plague. L pills and explosives; destroy the bridge or destroy yourself. Die like a gentleman, when the only important thing is to live like a human being.

But this is more than rhetoric; Shears is determined to save a human life even if they fail to reach their objective.

The final sequence of the film contains some of the same transcendent impulse. Warden, who has trained a mortar on matically heaves the mortar down a hill, under the accusing his own wounded in order to prevent their capture, drayes of the Burmese girls. And above all, we have the final words of the film, spoken by Dr. Clipton amidst a scene of utter carnage: "Madness, madness!"

But all of this is undone by an emotional undertone of another quality which emerges clearly dominant in the end. Young Joyce provides a clue: in commando school he is not sure he can bring himself to use a knife in cold blood. But in

the end he uses it on Saito. He learns to kill, and the audience is emotionally with him. And so it is with Shears. Throughout the film he is anti-military, but suddenly he goes gung-ho. "Kill him, kill him!", he screams at Joyce as Nicholson tries to prevent him from blowing up the bridge, and again the audience smells blood.

Consider the audience reaction to the impending destruction of the bridge. I have watched three separate audiences closely during the closing minutes of the film, and without exception they were rooting for a good, big explosion. In fact, they scarcely remained to hear Clijfton's final judgment. When the bridge blew, the film was over as far as they were concerned. In short, the film leaves its audience emotionally sympathetic to the cause of destruction. They see the bridge not as a beautiful creation, but as an enemy military installation. It is crucial to understand at this point that in the

novel the bridge is *not* destroyed. The novel therefore succeeds in forcing its readers to a higher plane of consciousness.

In the last analysis, *The Bridge on the River Kwai* strangles in its own contradictions. It sets out to rebel if not against military authority as such, at least against *blind* military authority, but it ends by justifying that very blindness. The stricken, staggering Nicholson somehow muddles through. Blind, unconscious, half dead, he gets the job done.

Relax, citizen, you are in good hands. The military mind may have its blind spots, but they will be overcome in the end. Above all, think no subversive thoughts about the fire-pots poised at the very foundations of our Bridge.

Such are the sorry conclusions of what might have been a great motion picture.

—BOB BONE

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Who Becomes a Communist?

THE AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY: A Critical History (1919-1957) by Irving Howe and Lewis Coser with the Assistance of Julius Jacobson. Boston: Beacon Press, 1958, 593 pp.

WITH PRECISION AND GRACE, this well-documented study of the American Communist Party from its inception in 1919 to its virtual demise in 1957 by a trio of democratic socialists, two of whom are editors of the socialist quarterly *Dissent*, tells a story of human waste. A story familiar to some, misunderstood or forgotten by others, it is new perhaps only to the generation of the Fifties, yet important reading for a much wider audience because it is the first of its kind, a one-volume history of Communism as a political and intellectual current and of its relation to the total quality of American life.

While a substantive and often brilliant history of the Communist Party occupies the bulk of the volume, I shall focus attention on a major sociological analysis of Stalinism as a political movement in the West which appears as a concluding essay of some fifty pages. This chapter, important in and of itself, illuminates and gives theoretical meaning to the historical narrative. It gives the entire volume an importance which differs from that of Theodore Draper's magnificent study of the Early American Communist Party, *The Roots of American Communism*.

Critical of attempts to construct a model of the Communist movement by indiscriminately mixing quotations from Lenin's early writings with recent pronouncements of Stalin and his successors, the authors delimit the topic under investigation: the process whereby one Communist Party in the context of the gradual counter-revolution in Russia during the twenties and thirties was transformed from a group of devoted revolutionaries "enthusiastically uncritical of Leninism" into an agency of "a totalitarian state functioning through a skillful appropriation of the revolutionary tradition and vocabulary."

A key to this transformation is provided by the Marxist concept of alienation—the process by which social institutions

that men create seem to acquire an autonomy of their own beyond the practical or cognitive grasp of their creators. The self-alienation of the Stalinist movement appears in the relation between leaders and followers and in the reification of ideas.

To understand the persistence of the movement it is necessary to employ additional categories which none of the prevalent monolithic theories provide. Communism is not just a conspiracy, or a new secular religion in arms, or a mass totalitarian party. It is all of these but none of these alone, and it cannot be understood outside of its historical context. No explanation can afford to disregard the social conditions in which Stalinism appeared. "Communism and its cruel caricature, Stalinism, derived not from a psychological malaise unique to or predominant among its adherents but from a general breakdown of modern society." No explanation that is uniquely psychological can account for its many-sided character as a social movement. No simple economic explanation can account for its differential impact among equally deprived groups. There is little evidence to support the contention that Stalinism's greatest appeal is in areas of economic deprivation. Many of the most impoverished areas have been only faintly susceptible, while in England and the United States the Communist parties have gained most of their support from the less deprived sections of the population.

To explain the differential impact of Stalinism among specific social groupings the authors introduce a further discrimination, the concept of "relative deprivation." Not absolute deprivation but a sudden traumatic awareness of relative deprivation, the clash between a proclaimed ideal and the felt reality, seems to be a major immediate cause for the growth of Stalinism. A social group will begin to compare its lot with other groups when it no longer accepts implicitly the traditional "legitimation" for the *status quo*. It follows that the role of those who deal professionally with the symbols of legitimacy—the intellectuals and quasi-intellectuals—is crucially important. Though the absolute well-being of the workers in the West has increased in the past century, this

has not prevented their *sense* of social disparity from becoming one of the overwhelming facts of 20th century European politics. Where all other parties are or seem to be committed to the defense of the *status quo*, it follows that Stalinism with its claim to a total revolutionary situation will reap the political profits. The key to why a disproportionate number of American Stalinists were first-generation immigrants or their sons or daughters would also seem to be a sense of social disparity.

Anxiety as a Factor

To explain the strength of this particular anti-capitalist ideology the authors explore the relationship between the Stalinist movement and its followers and introduce the concept of "anxiety," not as a psychological category but as a social category. Whereas autonomy and freedom of the personality was the ideal of the early Socialist movement and that movement created conditions favorable to its development, the Stalinist militant was usually characterized by a fear of independence; "his personality became a function of his belonging" and to a lesser degree appropriated the strength of the outer force to itself. The sense of insignificance was accompanied by a free-floating aggressiveness and *resentment* (undirected hostility arising out of diffuse feelings of hatred and envy). Threats to the self could be compensated by passive reliance on the strength of the leaders. There was the physical power of the Soviet Union. Soon it became difficult, as indeed unnecessary, for the faithful Stalinist to distinguish between approval of Russia because she was right and adoration because she was strong. There was, in addition, the power of systematized intellectual reassurance. Members were bound not by the ideology but by "*The organization as the faith made visible.*" Faith resided not in the total world-picture of Stalinism but in the certainty that the movement would sooner or later proclaim the correct line, not in particular leaders but in the institution and in the *idea* of leadership. Thus, the authors write:

Ego strength and weakness are grounded in historical contexts—they are social categories. . . . Men who are powerless, or feel themselves to be so, all too often overcome their anxieties not through autonomous cooperation but through a regressive identification with authorities, which, in turn, leads to further anxiety and still greater reliance on authority and finally to what Franz Neumann has called 'caesaristic identification'. . . . Thus, an essential condition for the growth of Stalinism was that it appear as a reaction to great defeats suffered by the European radical movements. *Stalinism was the movement that came afterward—after the defeat and disillusion, after everything seemed lost yet the power of the Soviet Union remained.*

From such questions as the impact of Stalinism and varying susceptibilities to it, the essay turns to the nature of the movement itself. The analysis is preceded by an important critique of theories that present Stalinism as an armed secular religion or as a gigantic conspiracy with most of its members active or potential conspirators. For the inner core of leadership, which saw itself as an elite of *the knowing*, and for the outer rim, which saw the party as a militant organization defending its rights, quasi-religious impulses were of little import. The rate of turnover presents a major difficulty for religious and conspiratorial interpretations: Membership in the Communist parties has always fluctuated very widely, and the majority of members consisted of people who abandoned the party after

a short stay. The religious and conspiratorial interpretations imply that party members owed loyalty to no one but the Kremlin. Whatever the case for leaders and devoted militants, the ordinary American Communist was not permanently cut off from society. "The status of a 'conspiracy' that is constantly creating masses of ex-conspirators surely would seem problematic."

The nature of the Stalinist movement can be more fully grasped by studying the structure of the party and the roles of leaders and followers. The analysis begins, therefore, with an inquiry into how the movement selected its leadership. The transition from what might be termed democratic to bureaucratic leadership is mapped out and, though it soon developed a momentum of its own, attributed, above all, to the process of cataclysmic change in the entire political-moral tone of the Communist movement. Just as this movement was carefully structured into several organizational levels, so it operated on several ideological levels: the party's esoteric or inner doctrine, demanding unqualified allegiance to the Soviet Union, and its exoteric or public doctrine, stressing the power and/or benevolence of the Soviet Union without demanding a total and unqualified allegiance to the Russian leadership. The esoteric doctrine seldom percolated beyond militants and sometimes not even to second-rank functionaries. What mattered for the mass membership was the exoteric doctrine, which explained why for the moment the party needed to advance a given line and, in addition, served as a means of collective reassurance for those disturbed by shifts in party program.

Marxism and Stalinism

In the concluding section of this essay, the authors elucidate the complex relations between Marxist ideology and Stalinist totalitarian practice. "The totalitarian party is 'unprincipled' in the root sense of the term." Stalinism conceived ideology not as a pattern of ideal norms that guide policy but as an instrument of power. Not that the trappings of Marxism were useless survivals; for many they provided an indispensable means of reassurance, and for the party they facilitated the strategy of political access. But the humanist core of Marxism was discarded and without this, Marxism degenerates into a technological optimism which sees progress only in terms of how many new steel mills are constructed under each Five-year plan. And in rejecting the humanist core of Marxism with its insistence that the masses of humanity can achieve their liberation only through their own autonomous efforts, Stalinism became not a 'bad' socialist ideology, but a totalitarian defense of the totalitarian state which stands totally opposed to the motivating humanism of democratic socialism.

JUDITH BLOCH

Judith Bloch is a graduate student at Columbia.

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BOOKS IN REVIEW

The Philosophy of Art History by Arnold Hauser. Alfred A. Knopf, \$7.50.

Arnold Hauser is certainly one of the finest Marxist literary and art critics in the world today. Only George Lukacs, the Hungarian now under close supervision because of his participation in the Revolution in 1956, and Arnold Kettle are even on the same level. And when all is said and done, Hauser's *Social History of Art* (now available in paperback) is probably the most important single work of historical materialist criticism ever to be published.

In the *Social History*, there was an implied theoretical point of view, but it was never explicitly developed. Now, in the *Philosophy of Art History*, Hauser gives a careful, complex and even difficult statement of his methodology. He rejects, of course, that formalism which has such a vogue today and which conceives of the history of art (if it thinks of history at all) as a hermetically sealed progression of "formal" problems and their solution. But on the other hand, Hauser has no time for the scholarly historicists or for the vulgar Marxists. He is extremely sensitive to the unique in the great work of art, to that limited autonomy which genius wrests from material and social conditions. Indeed, he points out that the most "characteristic" works of an age, those which most clearly exhibit pervasive stylistic trends, are often of the second rank: for the masterpiece has somehow gone on beyond.

Thus, Hauser sees a complex dialectic: "... the fact is that the Renaissance and the artistic individuality of Raphael come into being all at once and inseparably. Not only is the performance, that is, the works of Raphael Leonardo and Michelangelo, the result of certain tasks, but the tasks themselves take on definite shapes only when the possible solutions are seen." Or: "We shall not go wrong if we regard the process of style-formation as a dialectic movement between the poles of the technical and the visionary, the rational and the irrational, social requirements and individual impulses. ..."

Of course, it is literally impossible to communicate the extremely rich trend of thought which Hauser represents in a short essay. In addition to his central theoretical discussion, there is also a fine essay on Freud and art which approaches the psycho-analytic method in literature with a critical sympathy. Hauser's discussion of the romantic roots, not simply of the Freudian view of literature (the unconscious as creative), but of the human personality, is extremely provocative. It goes considerably deeper than Lionel Trilling's excellent essay in *The Liberal Imagination* and is a real contribution.

To be sure, this book has inadequacies. It is not easy to read, since Hauser is taking great scholarly care with his subject and explores every facet of it painstakingly. There are deficiencies of judgment—a theory of Shakespeare is assumed as fact with

lightning speed—but these are inevitable to an encyclopaedic intellect like Hauser's. But these flaws should not obscure the major point: for those willing to give the *Philosophy of Art History* the close attention which it deserves, here is one of the most rewarding studies in years. It is a powerful antidote to the nonsense that has so often masqueraded under the name of "Marxism"; it is a convincing demonstration of the aesthetic richness of the historical materialist method.

M.H.

V. I. LENIN: *Letter to the Congress; The Attribution of Legislative Functions to the State Planning Commission; The Question of Nationalities or of "Autonomization."* Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, d.d., 30 pp.

A thin pamphlet, with a long title beginning unobtrusively "Letter to the Congress," which is to be found around Stalinist bookstores handling English-language stuff published from Moscow, will be found on inspection to be unusual indeed: it is the famous "Testament" of Lenin now published for the first time by the Communists themselves and, as a bonus, containing the text of a blast by Lenin against Stalin on the national question which has never been published before.

The "Testament" so-called consists of letters dictated by Lenin in December 1922 and January 1923, when he was immobilized in bed by the illness which would kill him in another year. A series of twelve such memos, dictated in this way, were kept secret by the Stalin regime. The "Testament" proper, which is made up by the second and third items in this new pamphlet, examined the characteristics of Lenin's leading colleagues—Trotsky, Stalin, Bukharin, Piatkov, and others—and wound up with a recommendation that Stalin be removed as general secretary of the party. The story of this "Testament," its reception and its subsequent history, has been told in detail by Trotsky and needs no repetition here. (See his pamphlet, *The Suppressed Testament of Lenin*.)

The other documents in this collection, however, are newly published. The most interesting are the last three, in which Lenin came out in open attack on Stalin, on the Georgian question in particular and the national question in general. While Trotsky's *The Stalin School of Falsification* (pp. 65-71) and his *Stalin* (pp. 357-364) give the background, the text of the letters had apparently been lost by Trotsky, and only two short quotations were included in his works.

The letters contain a head-on denunciation, by name, of Stalin and his supporters,

Orjonikidze and Dzerzhinsky. Lenin inveighs against the Soviet government apparatus—

"... an apparatus which, in fact, is still quite alien to us. ... It is quite natural in such circumstances that the 'freedom to withdraw from the union' by which we justify ourselves will be a mere scrap of paper unable to defend the non-Russians from the onslaught of that really Russian man, the Great-Russian, the chauvinist, in substance a rascal and a lover of violence, as the typical Russian bureaucrat is."

There are a number of other interesting passages including caustic comment (twice) on the fact that Russified non-Russians—like the Georgians Stalin and Orjonikidze—may be worse chauvinists than Great-Russians.

The publication of these documents was associated with the explosion of revelations at the 20th Congress in 1956; these letters were made available to the congress delegates, published in the *Kommunist* (No. 9, 1956) and then published separately as a pamphlet, to be "sent out to the party organizations." We were not aware till now, however, that Moscow had put it out in English as well.

H. D.

ANVIL Recommends

**The Negro Novel
in America
by ROBERT BONE**

Yale University Press

The writing of Robert Bone is familiar to the readers of *Anvil*. In this new study, he discusses the development of the Negro novel in relation to the history of the Negroes in the United States. It is a must for students of literature and for those who seek a deeper understanding of the cultural aspects of the Civil Rights struggle.

A complete review will appear in the next issue of *Anvil*.

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